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1
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we shall try to describe how taxes affect economic
growth. This area is of significant importance for modern trends in public finance
and macroeconomics. Many economists have tried to explain lower growth rates
and unemployment in mid-seventies with a growing tax burden in many developed
countries. However, many dilemmas have remained open and the empirical
relation between taxes and growth seems to be much more complex than
theoretical findings suggest. 
Although the impact of taxes on growth can be observed both
from the aspect of efficiency and aspect of changes in equity that taxes introduce
to economy, in this paper we shall primarily focus on the impact that taxes have
on growth by changing efficiency of the economy. 
The paper is set up in the following way. First we shall present
theoretical aspect of the relation between taxes and growth, that is, loss of efficiency
as a result of introduction of taxes, as well as channels through which taxes affect
accumulation of two basic factors of production: capital and labor. We shall
continue with a review of the latest empirical research. Some implications of the
established theoretical and empirical relations for defining and pursuing tax policy
in Croatia are presented in the fourth section of this paper. 




2.1 Tax distortions and growth
One of the central questions in macroeconomics and public
finance is how changes in tax policy affect economic activity and social welfare. In
theory, it is usually considered that taxes are in a negative correlation with growth
- so higher taxes mean lower growth rates of economy. This is explained with the
fact that taxes introduce distortions to economy, that is, they do not have neutral
effect on the behavior of individuals. All taxes except lump sum tax (being the only
neutral tax, although impossible to carry through in practice) introduce distortions
to an economic system. Tax distortions change the system of incentives for
individuals, so their decisions on, for example, work and leisure or saving and
consumption are different than they would be in a world without taxes. The
distortions that taxes introduce to economy result in loss of efficiency, which is
called dead weight loss or excess tax burden. Therefore, higher taxes mean higher
rates of distortion, which leads to higher loss of efficiency and, consequently, lower
growth. Further in this paper we shall briefly explain this established theoretical
relation between higher taxes and lower growth. 
Consequently, taxation leads to inefficiency in economy. Taxes
stimulate people to change their behavior: for example, they could either work as
much as before introduction of taxes and reduce their spending, or work more and
spend less time at leisure, thus not needing to reduce spending substantially.
Whichever way they choose to come to terms with taxes, they will be worse off
than in a world without taxes and the balance in the market will be established on
a lower level of output and higher level of prices. The allocation of resources is not
Pareto optimal any more and the inefficiency that leads to lower growth has
entered the system. 
The inefficiency caused by taxes, will be presented with a simple
supply and demand diagram. In other words, taxes have impact on the amount of
supply and demand for goods. Taxation puts both consumers and producers in a
worse position: the price that consumers pay after introduction of taxes is higher
and the price that producers get is lower than before taxation. The market has
narrowed because lower quantity of goods is being exchanged. The decrease in
consumers' and producers' welfare turns into tax revenue of the state. Thus, for the
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purpose of full understanding of the impact of taxes on welfare, the decrease in
welfare of consumers and producers should be compared with the tax revenue
collected by the state. Such an analysis will show that the decrease in consumers'
and producers' welfare exceeds the tax revenue collected by the state. The loss of
welfare that takes place after introduction of taxes (a part of which belongs to no
one - neither to a consumer or producer, nor to the state) represents a dead weight
loss or excess tax burden, or a degree of inefficiency that taxes introduce to
economy. However, full understanding of dead weight loss requires a detailed
analysis of its generation. 
To this end, we shall use supply and demand curves and
consumer and producer surplus shown in the Figure 1. Firstly, we will explain the
terms "consumer and producer surplus" in a market without taxes, so that later we
could see what happens when taxes are. 
 
          Figure 1
          DEAD
          WEIGHT 
          LOSS
Source: Mankiw (1997).
The equilibrium in a market without taxes is established at the
intersection of the supply curve and demand curve, where price of goods equals P1
and quantity equals Q1. Consumer surplus then represents a benefit that a
consumer gains in the market. It is defined as a value that a consumer is willing
to pay for goods minus the price that he actually pays for these goods in the
market. In Figure 1, it is the surface between the demand curve and the price in the
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The triangle C+E is also called Harberger Triangle, after famous economist Arnold1
Harberger, who graphically represented the dead weigh loss. (Mendoza, Milesi-Feretti
and Asea, 1995).
point of equilibrium: A+B+C. On the other hand, producer surplus is a benefit
that a producer gains in the market. It is defined as a value that the producer gets
for his goods in the market, minus cost of production of these goods. It is the
surface between the supply curve and the price in the point of equilibrium: in our
figure, it is the D+F+E surface. Being the sum of consumer surplus and producer
surplus, the total surplus of welfare is represented with the surface between the
supply curve and the demand curve, extending all the way to the equilibrium point:
this is the A+B+D+F surface.
But when the state introduces taxes (T), the price that
consumers pay grows and the price that producers get drops. The price that
consumers pay has now grown to P  and the price that producers get after payingc
taxes to the state is now only P . The quantity exchanged on market is now onlyb
Q , which is lower than Q  , which was exchanged in the market before2 1
introduction of taxes. Thus, by reducing the quantity of goods being exchanged,
taxes have narrowed the market, while the price paid by consumers has grown and
the price that producers get has dropped. Besides, taxes have lead to a change in
consumer surplus and producer surplus. Consumer surplus is not represented with
the surface A+B+C any more, but has been reduced to the surface A only.
Producer surplus is not represented with the surface D+E+F any more, but only
with the surface F. The state, on the other hand, has collected taxes equal to
(0Q *T), represented with the surface B+D in the figure. It shows welfare of the2
state. The total welfare surplus is now equal to A+B+C+D+E+F, that is, it
comprises consumer surplus, producer surplus and state taxes. 
Now, by comparing the welfare before and after introduction of
taxes, we can analyze the effects of introduction of taxes to the market. The total
surplus of welfare before introduction of taxes was A+B+C+D+E+F, but after the
introduction it dropped to A+B+D+F, which means that it has been reduced by
the surface C+E. This surface represents reduction of the total welfare in the
market after introduction of taxes and is called dead weight loss . In other words,1
introduction of taxes has reduced the consumer and producer surpluses more than
it has increased the state welfare. A part of this welfare belongs to no one: it is
neither a part of state income, nor a part of total surplus. It is lost forever. Thus,
a part of the welfare in the economy is lost, because the consumers and producers
have lost more than the state has gained through the taxes - the dead weight loss
has occurred. 
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See in Stiglitz (1998, p. 454).2
What determines the size of the dead weight loss? First, we have
price elasticity of supply and demand, which measures the change in quantity of
the supplied and demanded goods, depending on the change of price. The surface
of C+E triangle, that is, the rate of dead weight loss, is defined with the slopes of
supply and demand curves that reflect different values of price elasticity of supply
and demand. It can be shown that under the conditions of the same rate of taxes,
a higher price elasticity of demand curve, or a higher price elasticity of supply curve
can lead to a higher dead weight loss. The more elastic the curves are, the higher
is the inefficiency that taxes introduce to the market. The fact is, taxes introduce
dead weight loss to the economy because they stimulate people to change their
behavior. Since elasticity of supply and demand is a measure of change in the
behavior of consumers and producers in relation to change of prices, it also
determines the rate of market distortion. The more elastic supply and demand
curves are, the higher is the dead weight loss. 
Another important determinant of the size of dead weight loss
is the tax rate. When price elasticity of supply and demand is the same, dead
weight loss is low when taxes are low and it grows when they grow. Indeed, dead
weight  loss grows faster than most taxes: the size of dead weight loss grows with
the second power of the tax rate. We can say that the size of dead weight loss
(provided that production costs are constant) is equal to 1/2 (Et  PQ), where t is tax2
rate, E is price elasticity of demand, P is price and Q is quantity of goods .2
Obviously, if the tax rate increases twofold, the dead weight loss increases fourfold.
In case when supply and demand can only be presented with curves and not with
straight lines, the basic logic remains: the growth of dead weight loss is exponential
with the tax rate growth. 
2.2 Taxation of savings
and investment
Taxes can reduce economic growth by affecting savings and
investment. The higher the proportion of income that is being saved and invested,
the higher will be the future income level. In other words, through its impact on
the amount of the income being saved or invested, taxation policy has a crucial
effect on the future level of income per capita. The impact of taxes on saving (of
individuals and companies), investment in fixed capital and investment risk is
briefly presented below.
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Impact of taxes on savings of individuals
The gross savings in private sector are accumulated in
households and companies. However, a large part of the gross savings is used for
covering depreciation and is needed for the maintenance of the existing capital. The
net savings, consisting of savings in households and retained earnings of
companies, represent the real potential, available for new investments. The major
part of these savings is accumulated in households, while the retained earnings
account for only a small part of them. 
If all households would save the same proportion of income,
then the impact of income tax on the total savings would be the same, regardless
of the pattern of the distribution of tax burden to individuals. But, wealthy
individuals save more than poor citizens, so it is expected that the taxes collected
from higher tax brackets create more burden on savings than the ones collected
from lower tax brackets. Consequently, a more progressive income tax seems to be
creating a heavier burden on savings than a less progressive tax system. This claim
suggests that a less progressive income tax system would be favorable to the
increase in savings of individuals. However, research has established that the
impact of income progressiveness on level of savings is much less important than
it could be expected: replacement of progressive income tax with a proportional one
could increase household savings by not more than 10 percent (Musgrave and
Musgrave, 1988). The propensity to save also varies during a life cycle: in youth
and in old age it is much lower than in middle age when income is highest and
when people save for education of their kids, for a house or a flat and for the old
age.
Income tax also affects savings by lowering the net return from
savings, that is, by lowering the interest rate on savings. In such conditions, savings
are expected to drop. However, the savings of individuals are motivated with
various other reasons and their final amount does not have to depend on interest
rate trends only. For example, many households will not save less when interest
rates are lower, because they are in that part of life cycle when they have to save for
retirement. 
Besides income tax, consumption tax also affects savings of
individuals. While income tax is generally progressive, consumption taxes are
mostly regressive, that is, they are mostly paid by lower-income households. Since
these households have a higher marginal propensity to consume than the
households with higher income and since their marginal propensity to save is lower
than the one of wealthy individuals, consumption taxes burden total consumption
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more and savings less. This is why it is often recommended to the countries with
low level of savings that they should direct their tax systems to taxation of
consumption much more, because this will boost savings and growth, too. 
Impact of tax on gross savings of companies
Retained earnings and depreciation reserves account for the
predominant part of company savings. Since profit is taxed after deduction of
depreciation, income tax does not reduce the depreciation reserves. But if profit
taxation law allows accelerated depreciation, then depreciation reserves and
company savings will increase in the first years following the purchase of fixed
assets. Profit is divided in the dividends distributed to company owners and
undistributed profit remaining in the company. Different taxation of the dividends
and retained profit has an impact on savings, too. Harder taxation of the retained
profit will stimulate its distribution to dividends, while lower taxation of the
retained profit will increase the company's savings. The amount of savings also
depends on whether profit taxation system and income taxation system are
reconciled. If they are, double taxation of the dividends on company level and again
on the level of individuals is thus avoided. 
Impact of tax on investments
Savings are a necessary condition for accumulation of capital,
but not the sufficient one. In order to accumulate fixed capital, savings must turn
into investments, which means that entrepreneurs must be ready to invest in
capacity building.
Taxes can influence the level and allocation of domestic
investments. However, in the conditions of integration of international financial
markets, domestic investments are not necessarily constrained with domestic
savings. Thus, the measures stimulating the growth of domestic savings do not
necessarily mean growth of domestic investments. Increased domestic savings can
leave the country in search of investments with better return. Also, tax incentives
for increasing return on domestic investments can increase investing without
increasing domestic savings if free foreign capital inflow is allowed.
In closed economies, investors will invest up to a point where
the value of the output realized by an investment is equal to the costs of the that
investment (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1988). This means that the realized output
must be large enough to cover the depreciation f the purchased fixed assets and the
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interest on the credit granted for this purchase (for the sake of simplicity, we
presume that the investment is financed with the credit only). In terms of rates,
this means that the investment return rate must be high enough to cover the
depreciation rate and market interest rate. Or, expressed with the following
equation:
(1)  r  = i + d  ,g
where r  is a gross profit rate, i is interest rate, while d is depreciation rate. Afterg
introduction of tax, the equation changes:
(2)  r  = r  - (tr  - t ) = i + d - c  ,n g  g  d
where r  is a net profit rate, t is a tax rate, t  is a rate of  tax saving (being a resultn  d
of depreciation by rate d), while c is the rate of investment relieves. 
The left side of the equation (2) shows net profit rate r , orn
after-tax rate, which is lower than the gross profit rate for the amount of tax shown
in the brackets. Consequently, the tax has reduced the rate of investment return,
thus making investments less attractive to investors. The tax is expressed in two
ways: as tr , indicating what the tax would be if the depreciation would not beg 
taken into account, and t , representing tax saving as a result of depreciation by thed 
rate d. 
The equation also shows that the state can have impact on
investment either by lowering the tax rate t, or by increasing the depreciation rate
d, or by introducing tax relieves c that decrease the cost of capital. We can also see
from the above that it is very hard to determine what impact will taxes have on
investments. The income tax rate itself is not a good enough indicator of this
relation, because a higher rate does not necessarily mean lower investments. The
impact of tax on investments depends not only on the rate, but also on other
characteristics of income tax system. The depreciation rate and investment relieves
are just a couple among these.
Taxation and risk
It is usually considered that taxation of capital income decreases
the tendency of individuals to undertake risky investments. In other words,
individuals are willing to undertake risky investments only if they receive
appropriate compensation in return. It is a widespread opinion that taxation of the
return on capital actually means taxation of the risk premium that the individuals
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For impact of tax on labor market, see Nestiæ (1997).3
receive because of additional risk. As a result, the tendency of the individuals to
enter risky investments will be lower. This is important because it is considered
that entrepreneurship is crucial for the vitality of a market and entrepreneurs are
these individuals that act as key initiators of major investments. The investors'
unwillingness for new risky undertakings will have devastating impact on the rate
of growth. But it does not have to be that way. We can show that taxation of return
on capital in the conditions of risk does not have to mean a decrease in risky
investments - on the contrary, they will be stimulated.
This can be shown on a plain example, with rather simplified
assumptions (but the same result is obtained in a more complex approach, see e.g.
Musgrave and Musgrave, 1988). An entrepreneur invests in a safe investment and
in a risky investment. Let us assume that a tax rate is introduced, together with a
possibility of full transfer of losses to future income. The tax reduces the expected
rate of the return on risky investments, so it looks less attractive than the safe
investment. But, besides reducing the return on investment, the tax also reduces
its level of risk. The state becomes a partner in the investment. If the investment
is successful, the state shares the profit. But, if the investment fails, the state will
share its loss because it has allowed full transfer of losses to future income. The
individual is willing to increase risky investments after introduction of taxes,
because the state is willing to share the risk. This thesis is hard to prove because
of a number of reasons (Krelove, 1995). But the fact that wealthier individuals (who
also face higher tax rates) invest a larger part of their assets in the shares of
companies which are considered relatively risky compared to other investments,
can be taken as a rational empirical argument supporting the hypothesis that
taxation can actually encourage risk-taking (Krelove, 1995).
2.3 Taxation of labor
In this section we shall briefly present the mechanisms through
which taxation has impact on the growth of an economy.3
Impact of income tax and social security
contributions on wages and employment
Economic theory and empirics show that taxation of labor
reduces employment, thus lowering potential output. Here, labor taxes mean all
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We should note here that a difference should be made between legal  tax incidence4
and economic tax shifting. For example, legal distribution of income to employer and
employee does not necessarily represent the real, economic distribution of the burden
of social security contributions.
direct dues on labor, regardless whether they are collected in a form of income tax
or social security contributions. Taxation of labor introduces a difference between
real gross cost of labor for a company and real net wage that employees receive.
Thus, taxes create a difference between the cost of labor and net wage that is called
tax wedge in economic theory. Tax wedges are the basic value with which impact
of tax on labor market, that is, on the amount of supply and demand for labor is
analyzed. The amount of real gross cost of labor determines the amount of labor
demand, while the amount of real net wage determines the amount of labor supply.
What part of tax wedge will be distributed on the entrepreneur, thus determining
the labor demand, and what part of tax wedge will be distributed on the employee,
thus influencing the amount of labor that he can supply to the market, depends on
the possibility of tax incidence . In analyzing the impact of tax on employment rate4
and growth, it is essential therefore to analyze tax incidence. It depends on the
elasticity of supply and demand in labor market, as well as on other factors that
determine flexibility of wages (e.g. negotiating skills of unions, minimum wage
etc.).
Thus, for example, in markets where negotiating skills of
unions are not strong, or where labor supply is not flexible to change of wages, an
entrepreneur will be able to shift taxes on the worker, which will result in a lower
net wage and the same gross cost of labor for the employer. In a real situation,
workers will eventually react on reduction of their net wages, i.e. reduction of their
income. Are they to offer a higher or lower amount of labor to the market now? If
substitution effect prevails, they will offer less labor, expanding their leisure time.
If income effect prevails, the workers will want to work more, in order to
compensate for the lost income, which will result in a higher amount of labor in
the market. This means that workers' reaction on taxes can be to work more or to
work less, depending on what will prevail - substitution effect or income effect.
Only empirical research can help finding out which of the effects prevails in a given
market, that is, will introduction of taxes and reduction of real net wage encourage
people to offer more or less labor.
In markets where negotiating skills of unions are strong and
where labor supply is flexible to changes of wage, an entrepreneur will not be able
to shift taxes on workers. The workers will react to introduction of taxes with
demands for increased net wages. This will make the cost of labor higher for the
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entrepreneur and he will reduce the demand for labor. Such reduced demand for
labor results in reduced employment rate and, with constant use of capital, could
lead to lower growth. 
Empirical research indicates that labor markets are mostly rigid,
that is, entrepreneurs bear higher tax burden than workers (Leibfritz, Thornton and
Bibbee, 1997). So, when conditions in labor market are rigid, workers will oppose
paying labor tax, thus initiating a negotiating process and pressure for wage
increase. This will increase the cost of labor for entrepreneurs. For its part, higher
cost of labor for entrepreneurs reduces demand for labor; by changing relative costs
of labor and capital, it stimulates capital-intensive production. Thus, reduction of
tax burden on labor, as well as reduction of rigidity in a labor market (reviewing the
amount of minimum wage; unemployment benefit; increased mobility of labor
force) would lead to a higher supply and demand for labor. This would result in
increased employment rate on the one hand and increased output on the other
hand. 
Impact of taxes on consumption
on wages and employment
Beside direct taxes, indirect taxes (that is, consumption taxes)
also have impact on the supply of labor by reducing the purchasing power of net
wage. However, workers seem to be reacting somewhat slower to a change in the
consumption taxes, and the impact of the consumption taxes on labor supply also
appears within a longer period of time than normally is the case with direct taxes.
Social transfers that determine the quantity of labor supply in the market, also
bring additional distortions to labor market. 
This brief overview of the relations between taxes on labor and
growth indicates the complexity of the mechanism through which taxes form labor
income can reflect on economic growth. 
3
OVERVIEW OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
Empirical research of the impact of taxes on growth mostly does
not show such a clear relation as the theory suggests. Different empirical studies
yield very different results, making it hard to make unequivocal conclusions on
negative impact of taxes on growth. The difficulties that impede unequivocal
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conclusions on the basis of empirical researches mostly include the following: (1)
different definitions of state in different countries and periods (whether it is a
central government or general government with extra-budgetary funds and local
governments), which means different levels of taxation; (2) problems of measuring
of individual tax variables, such as marginal tax rates (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993;
Engen and Skinner, 1996); (3) difficulties in sorting out the impact of individual tax
variables on growth, because of complex interactions of fiscal variables (tax increase
does not have to reduce growth if such increased taxes are used for financing those
forms of public investments that will increase productivity of private investments,
thus stimulating growth); (4) difficulties in separating the impact on growth of
other economic variables from the impact of fiscal variables only; (5) it has turned
out that quantitative results are very sensitive to the parameters the values of
which have still not been estimated reliably (e.g. elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, labor supply elasticity, depreciation rate of human capital etc) (Xu,
1994); (6) lack of empirical data enabling unambiguous acceptance or rejection of
a conclusion of some theoretical model.
Further in the text we shall tackle the research on the relation
between taxes and growth that took place in the nineties and that is predominantly
based on endogenous models of growth. Since the goal of this study is not to
present historical development of the idea on the impact of taxes on growth, but
rather to present those studies which are important for building a foundation for
an efficient tax policy, we have decided to present only the studies made recently.
The impact of taxes on growth is one of the disciplines of
economics of which the lengthiest research was undertaken. Until mid-eighties, the
relation between taxes and growth was established in neoclassic models where
growth depends on the natural growth rate and rate of technological progress. The
taxes in these models only have impact on the income level, but not on growth
rate, except when shifting from one to another income level. But, since late
eighties, endogenous models have been developed, where it is possible for the
growth to be based on optimizing decisions of economic subjects, instead of on
exogenous variables, such as technical progress or population growth. When
long-term growth rate acquired endogenous characteristics, a theoretical base for
research of the role of economic policy in determining of an economic growth rate
was established. In endogenous models, economic subjects stimulate growth with
accumulation of physical and human capital. The motivation variable is real rate
of the return on capital. Taxes in endogenous models affect growth in such way
that they reduce it with taxation of factor incomes, because they reduce the real rate
of return on physical and human capital. 
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See e.g. Harberger (1964).5
In the beginning we should mention Arnold Harberger. In the
sixties, he dedicated a major part of his influential work to research of the key issue
of public finance: the relation between taxation policy and growth . He believed5
that taxation policy, i.e. structure of direct and indirect taxes, was a very important
determinant of investments and growth in theory, but that its effect on growth was
negligible in practice. Harberger assessed that changes in taxes could not increase
the national income growth rate by more than 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points
(according to Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti and Asea, 1995). In his opinion, changes in
taxation policy have no significant impact on economic growth in practice. In other
words, taxation policy seems to be "superneutral". 
Using endogenous models of growth, Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti
and Asea (1995) tried to test Harberger's thesis. Their research confirms Harberger's
assertion that the effect of taxes on growth is very small. It means that big changes
in a taxation system are required for any visible changes in economic growth to
take place. Nevertheless, they do not think that Harberger's superneutrality means
that tax reforms are useless. The fact is, reduction of tax distortions contributes to
a substantial increase in welfare (Mendoza and Tesar, 1995). 
In their study of impact of fiscal policy on growth, Engen and
Skinner (1992) develop a theoretical model which comprises the effects of
government spending and the distorting effects of taxes in an output growth model.
By using a sample of 107 countries in the period from 1970 to 1985, they have
established a strong negative effect of the fiscal activity of the state on growth rates,
both long-term and short-term. It is anticipated that a budget-balanced surplus of
the government spending and taxes of 10 percentage points leads to a long-term
reduction of growth rate of 1.4 percentage points.
Engen and Skinner (1996) are oriented only towards exploration
of the effect of taxes on economic growth. They underline the negative relation
between taxes and growth. They take Solow's approach to economic growth rate
as their starting point. According to this approach, economic growth rate depends
on available physical and human capital and on the changes in their productivity.
Put more formally:
(3)  y  = "  k  + $  m  + µ   ,i i  i  i  i  i
where y  is the rate of growth of real GDP in country i, k is the rate of growth ofi
capital funds in time, m is the rate of growth of effective labor force in time, µ  isi i
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the growth of overall productivity in an economy, while "  measures marginali
productivity of capital and $  is the elasticity of labor/output ratio. i
Within this theoretical frame, the authors give five ways in
which taxes can affect the growth of output, that is, they observe the impact of
taxes through the variables on the right-hand side of the above equation. First,
higher taxes can discourage investment, i.e. decrease net capital growth (the symbol
k in the above equation) in cases of high statutory rates of income tax and profit
tax, high taxation of capital gains or low depreciation deductions. Second, taxes can
weaken labor supply growth m, in such way that they discourage staying at work
and distort the choice between work and leisure, or between education and lower
qualification. Third, taxation policy can lower the productivity increase µ, in order
to discourage investment in research and development, or in high technologies,
that is, in the activities with large positive externalities which can thus stimulate
an increase in the productivity of the existing fund of labor and capital. Four,
taxation policy can have impact on the marginal productivity of capital, if it
redirects investments to sectors with lower taxes and lower overall productivity.
Five, high taxation of labor can distort efficient use of human capital in such way
that it can discourage working in sectors with high productivity and high tax
burden. In other words, countries with high tax burden can have lower values "
and $, which is a presumption of slower economic growth, provided that human
and physical capital is constant. 
On the basis of the above impact of taxes on the variables that
determine economic growth, we could conclude that that the impact of large tax
distortions on growth is huge. Engen and Skinner conclude their study by claiming
that, although taxation policy does have an impact on economic growth, that
impact is modest. They claim that "bottom up" analyses, made on a micro level,
and "top down" analyses, made by using cross country regressions, are close to a
conclusion that a large-scale tax reform, by which all marginal tax rates are
decreased by 5 percentage points and average tax rates are decreased by 2.5
percentage points, would contribute to an increase in the long-term economic
growth rate of between 0.2 and 0.3 percentage points. But even such a modest
effect on growth has substantial consequences on standard of living. The authors
have calculated what would be the negative consequences that inadequate taxes
cause to standard of living. They have established that, if there were an inefficient
tax structure in the USA between 1960 and 1996, which decreases growth rate by
0.2 percent per year, cumulatively in a period of 36 years, GDP in 1996 would be
7.5 percent lower. This would mean a net output lower for over 500 million USD
per year. So, although they are hard to establish by means of regression analyses,
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The authors have used cross-section data for around 100 countries in the period6
1970-1988, as well as historical series of data for 28 countries in the period 1870-1988.
After a 19  century economist Alfred Wagner, who formulated this law.7 th
potential effects of taxation policy do have large long-term consequences.
Consequently, taxes have a modest, yet cumulatively significant impact on
economic growth in a long run. The authors think that, besides the absolute
taxation level, the structure of taxation system is equally important for economic
growth. The countries that manage to collect taxes by means of a wide tax base and
efficient tax administration will probably realize faster growth rates than the
countries with a narrower tax base and inefficient tax administration.
The goal of Easterly and Rebelo (1993) is to show a connection
between different measures of fiscal policy, level of development and rate of
economic growth. As a part of their studies of the impact of fiscal policy on growth,
they examine the impact of taxes on growth and conclude that the impact of tax
is empirically hard to isolate. On the basis of a large amount of analyzed data , the6
authors make a series of conclusions on the relation between fiscal variables and
growth, of which we shall single out here the ones that talk about the relation
between taxes and growth:
        1. Of fiscal variables, only public investment in transport and
communications and budget surplus are correlated with the
growth in a robust manner. The relation between the remaining
fiscal variables and growth is statistically unstable. One of the
reasons for such instability is the multi-collinear character of
fiscal variables: they are highly correlated among themselves, so
it is hard to single out the impact of each of them on the
dependent variable. Therefore, the effects of an increase in
public investments financed with increased taxes do not always
have perfectly clear consequences for the growth.
        2. Of all the tax variables observed, the marginal rate of income
tax (measured by regression on the basis of time series) is the
only one that is correlated with the growth. This confirms the
theory that income tax reduces the return on investment, thus
acting as a disincentive for private investments and growth.
        3. The share of the government revenues in GDP grows with the
increase in income per capita, in the group of cross-section data
and in the group of historical data. This increased importance
of government in economy is often mentioned in literature and
is called the Wagner Law.7
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        4. As income grows, the share of customs duties in overall
government revenues drops and the share of income tax grows.
On the basis of annual data for 20 industrial countries in the
period 1970-1995, Mcdermott and Wescott (1996) analyze the increase in budget
deficit and public debt that has appeared because public expenditure has grown
much faster than tax increase. They believe that further increase of taxes for the
purpose of spanning this gap is not possible, because, besides creating political
resistance, it would also introduce additional distortions to economy. This is why
they think that a fiscal consolidation is necessary. This fiscal consolidation would
lead to reduction of budget deficit and public debt and would be based on reduction
of public expenditure. But, the economists of Keynesian beliefs claim that reduced
deficit leads to reduced demand and slower growth. In the author's opinion, fiscal
consolidation will not reduce the growth. Quite contrary - a well-prepared
consolidation can lead to increased demand and accelerated growth even in a period
of contraction. Two conditions should be met so that fiscal consolidation could
really accelerate growth. First, it has to be of a large scale (the average amount of
a successful fiscal contraction was 4 percent of potential GDP). A large-scale
adjustment stands much better chances to increase confidence in the government
economic policy, thus stimulating growth. Second, only a well-structured fiscal
consolidation can lead to a drop in interest rates, increase in investments and
economic growth. A budget contraction oriented towards the expenditure side, i.e.
reduction of the transfers and wage-and-salary fund in the state sector, stands
much more chances of succeeding in reduction of public debt than tax increase.
This is an indirect way of reaching a conclusion that is important to us in this
study - that fiscal consolidation should not be carried out by increasing taxes,
because it is not certain that such a process will be successful and lead to a higher
growth. 
Alesina and Perotti (1996) have reached the same conclusions
by studying the OECD countries. They think that the fiscal adjustments based on
reduction of transfers and the wage-and-salary fund have a better chance to succeed
and lead to a growth. Research has shown that the adjustments based on increased
taxes not only do not last long, but they also additionally inhibit the growth. 
In his review-study on the impact of taxation policy on growth
in various endogenous models, Xu (1994) concludes that neither empirical, nor
theoretical studies do not provide an unambiguous answer to a partial negative
correlation between the rate of economic growth and tax variables. However, this
correlation is not strong. 
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In theoretical models, positive, neutral or negative impact of taxes on
growth depends on special conditions such as the growth-stimulating mechanism,
the process that accumulates human capital and the way tax assets are spent. But,
regardless to lack of consensus over the impact of taxes on growth, the papers that
deal with this relation can provide an insight into the way in which alternative tax
policies affect the rate of growth of a country. Thus, choosing direct taxes (on
income and investments) or indirect taxes (on consumption) can have certain
consequences for the economic growth.
It seems that direct taxation of income or investments has a
negative long-term impact on growth. Growth can only be sustained if the key
incentive that directs individuals to invest in real capital (physical or human) is
present. In most of the endogenous growth models, this incentive is expressed with
the rate of real return on capital. Since income taxes or investment taxes lower the
rate of real return on capital, they also reduce the incentive for individuals to
behave in a way which stimulates growth, i.e. to invest in fixed assets or to educate
themselves. This is why income taxes and investment taxes have negative impact
on growth in a long run.
But, besides direct impact, income taxes and investment taxes
can also have indirect impact on growth. This indirect impact can either be positive
or negative. If tax receipts are used for investing in public infrastructure, then an
income tax or an investment tax can have positive impact on growth to a certain
extent. Up to the point where investments create optimal dimensions of
infrastructure in an economy, the positive indirect impact on growth which is
generated by increased investments in public infrastructure is higher than the
negative direct impact derived from taxation of income. In turn, the net impact that
taxation of income has on the growth becomes negative when investing in
infrastructure in an economy is continued beyond an optimal point. 
On the other hand, it is believed that the direct impact of taxes
on consumption is negligible in the long term. The reason for this is the fact that
consumption taxes do not affect the decision in the moment of spending (whether
spending will take place today or later). Therefore, consumption taxes do not affect
the incentive for capital accumulation, including return on capital, which is
considered as the basic generator of growth in the endogenous growth models.
As theoretical models suggest that there is a different impact of
taxes on growth in different economic conditions, it is not surprising that the
results of empirical models also fail to provide unambiguous answers. Economic
conditions in different countries are very different. 
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In the USA, these discussions have been going on for years. They become particularly8
fierce when introduction of VAT to the tax system is discussed (see Milesi-Ferretti and
Roubini, 1995).
Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1995) have also used an
endogenous growth model, examining what would be the effects on growth of the
transformation of the current taxation system in the USA, which is mostly based
on taxation of income, into a system mostly based on consumption taxes . The8
authors conclude that taxation of factor income (from human and physical capital)
reduces growth. This happens because introduction of taxes lowers the rate of
return from factor input, which discourages accumulation of labor and capital. On
the other hand, the authors believe that the impact of consumption taxes on
growth is not negligible, but that it largely depends on the elasticity of labor supply.
The more elastic the labor supply is, the more consumption taxes stimulate
workers to substitute their work and education with leisure. This way,
accumulation of labor factors is lower and economic growth is reduced. Still, the
authors conclude through their model that this is the only distorting impact that
consumption taxes have on growth, while income taxes not only affect the relation
between work and leisure, but they also lower the accumulation of capital and
economic growth by means of other mechanisms (e.g. by lowering the rate of
return). These considerations indicate that optimal tax structure should be more
based on consumption taxes than income taxes. 
In his Ph.D. thesis, Cashin (1994) examines the impact of
public investment, public transfers and distorting taxes (all taxes except lump sum
taxes) on the growth rate, by using an endogenous growth model. The model that
the author uses indicates that distorting taxes have a strong negative impact on
growth. Theoretical implications of the model were tested on a sample of 23
developed countries in the period from 1971 to 1988, where the share of current
budget revenue in GDP was used as a tax variable. The econometric results
confirmed the theoretical findings. Same as Xu, Cashin concluded that taxes reduce
the marginal return on private capital, thus reducing the economic growth. On the
other hand, a productive public spending in a form of public investments and
transfer payments stimulates the growth. The author further concludes that, in
countries with a small-scale state (low share of public spending in GDP), a positive
impact of public investments on economic growth is predominant, whereas in the
case of large-scale states a reducing impact of distorting taxes on growth is
predominant. 
Tanzi and Schuknecht (1995) also studied the size of the
government (measured by the share of public spending or overall taxes in GDP) in
CROATIAN ECONOMIC SURVEY 1631996 - 1999
industrial countries. In a study that attracted great attention, they show that, in the
period from the end of the 19  century to present day, the state in industrialth
countries has grown, on average, from 8.3 percent of GDP to 47.2 percent of GDP.
However, the authors show that this significant increase in public spending and
taxes needed for their financing has not lead to a substantial economic and social
progress. Hence their conclusion that the state should be downsized to around 30
percent of GDP and that its role should be limited to establishing "the rules of the
game" in the market competition. 
And, finally, the latest regression research made for the OECD
countries (Leibfritz, Thornton and Bibbee, 1997) for the period 1980-1985, suggest
that there is a negative relation between tax rates and growth rate. The authors
anticipate that the growth of an average (weighted) tax rate by 10 percentage points
would lower the annual growth rate in the OECD countries for around 0.5
percentage points. 
On the basis of the overview of empirical research (a summary
of which is shown in Table 1). we can conclude that a large number of channels
through which tax impacts are transferred, as well as the complexity and entwined
nature of fiscal and other economic variables, is what makes empirical research
particularly complex. This research has thus provided somewhat disappointing
support to theoretical conclusions. 
But even without robust empirical results, most of the
researchers will agree that tax reforms which stimulate neutrality in taxation by
lowering tax rates, increasing tax base, decreasing tax exemptions and building such
tax structure that distorts incentives for accumulation of labor and capital to the
least extent, can stimulate the growth of output and employment. 
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Table 1
IMPACT OF TAXES ON GROWTH:
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH SUMMARY
Authors, year Results Consequences for economic
policy
1. Harberger (1964) - impact of taxes on growth - taxation policy is “superneutral”
  negligible
2. Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti and - impact of taxes on growth - growth requires substantial
    Asea (1995)   negligible   changes in tax system  
3. Engen and Skinner (1992) - increase in G and T for 10 - growth rate drops when
  percentage points leads to a   increase in public spending is
  drop growth rate for 1.4   financed with higher taxes
  percentage points
4. Engen and Skinner (1996) - lowering of marginal tax rate by - tax reforms do not increase
  5 percentage points and   growth substantially, but they
  lowering of average tax rate by   improve standard in the long
  2.5 percentage points would   run
  contribute to increase of long-
  term growth rate by 0.2-0.3
  percentage points
5. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) - the impact of taxes on growth - only changes in income tax
  is hard to isolate empirically   rates have impact on growth
- only marginal income tax rate
  significantly explains
  differences in growth
6. McDermott and Wescott - increase in taxes does not lead - budget gap should be closed
    (1996)   to fiscal consolidation and   by lowering wages and
  growth   transfers, not by raising taxes
7. Alesina and Perotti (1996) - a consolidation based on taxes
  inhibits growth
8. Xu (1994) - direct taxes – negative impact - tax structure should rely more
  on growth   on consumption taxes
- indirect taxes – negligible
  impact
9. Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini - taxation of factor incomes - tax structure should rely more
    (1995)   suppresses growth   on consumption taxes
- the impact of taxes on 
  consumption is not negligible,
  but they are less distorting than
  income taxes
10. Cashin (1994) - strong negative impact of taxes - to reduce the size of
  on the growth in “large-scale   government
  government ” countries
11. Tanzi and Schuknecht - a large-scale government does - to reduce the size of
      (1995)   not substantially contribute to   government
  economic and social progress
12. Leibfritz, Thornton and - growth of average (weighted) - to reduce the size of
      Bibbee (1997)   tax rate of around 10 percent   government
  points would lower annual
  growth rate in the OECD
  countries by around 0.5
  percentage points
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In this section we shall mostly address those aspects of the tax reform that are related9
to economic growth.
4
IMPLICATIONS OF THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH FOR TAX POLICY IN CROATIA
4.1 Croatian tax reform
After gaining its independence, Croatia launched a reform of its
inherited tax system. That was a unique opportunity to build a tax system
applicable to a market economy. The main objective of the reform was to build a
neutral tax system, i.e. a tax system that would interfere in economic behavior of
economic subjects to the least possible extent, thus ensuring economic efficiency
and growth .9
Such a tax system should be based on a wide tax base, the least
possible number of tax exemptions and the least possible number of tax rates
(which should be reasonably low - see Box 1 for details). It ensures more efficient
allocation of resources (because it distorts prices to the least possible extent),
improves labor supply, stimulates private savings, reduces unofficial economy and,
finally, ensures economic growth. 
BOX 1.
PRINCIPLES OF TAX REFORM
The concrete recommendations of the majority of tax experts (The World
Bank, 1991) for a tax system reform are the following:
          - reduced number of tax rates for all sorts of taxes,
          - abolition of tax relieves,
          - widening of tax base,
          - simplified tax structure,
          - lower tax rates.
A tax system based on these recommendations is not suitable for pursuing
social policy. Social welfare for specific categories of the population, or
assistance to companies or sectors, is much more efficiently achieved with
direct subsidies than with lower tax rates or tax exemptions.
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Indirect taxes
Sales tax
It is believed that the most efficient means of taxation of consumption is
value added tax, which is based on a wide tax base, with the least possible
exemptions and zero rates and with a reasonably low tax rate. Besides, in a
modern VAT system, export and gross investments are not taxed. If possible
in any way, all goods and services should be taxed with a single rate, ranging
from 10 to 20 percent. Such a VAT system optimally reflects its good
characteristics: neutrality, simplicity and tax abundance. VAT should not be
used for ensuring an egalitarian distribution. Such problems should be solved
with other types of taxes or with direct transfers.
Excise taxes
Higher fairness of a tax system can be achieved by taxing luxurious consumer
goods with high income elasticity of  demand. This soothes regressive effect of
a single-rate VAT. Higher efficiency can be achieved by introducing excise
taxes on the goods the demand for which is non-elastic in terms of price and
which represent negative externalities. Excise taxes should be applied with an
equal rate for domestic and foreign producers.
Duties
In a tariff system, tariff base should be introduced by abolishing exemptions
and applying equal tariff burden in all sectors of economy. Tariff rate could be
reduced this way. Export duties should be avoided because they shift
resources to sectors with lower efficiency, thus threatening the growth.
Quantity restrictions of export and import should be replaced with duties and
protection should be realized with duties alone.
Direct taxes
Income tax
It is usually believed that a good income tax is based on low number of tax
brackets (not more than three), lowering upper marginal tax rate (not
exceeding 40 percent), widening tax base by abolishing exemptions, taxing
farmers and self-employed and taxing various wage supplements (hot meals,
transport). Equity is achieved by introduction of progressiveness by means of
establishing sufficient level of personal allowances (up to the level of one
GDP per capita, or, in countries with poor tax administration, up to two
GDPs per capita). Such an income tax has a wide tax base and is mildly
progressive. Ideally, tax should be collected from sources of income and under
identical conditions for domestic and foreign taxpayers.
Profit tax
A good profit tax should have a single proportional tax rate, equal to the upper
marginal income tax rate, in order to make transfer of taxpayers from one tax
form into another less probable. Less exemptions and differential treatment of
individual activities or sectors means more efficiency. If some tax incentives
are introduced nevertheless, they should be of limited range and duration and
defined as clearly as possible. Tax incentives should be limited to market
failures that cannot be resolved with direct methods.
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But, in addition to all these generally accepted commitments in
Croatian tax reform, one new principle has been applied, too. For although the
World Bank proposes taxation of income of physical persons, one hybrid form of
taxation of personal consumption has been introduced as a part of the Croatian tax
system reform. This form has been extended to taxation of profit, too (interest,
dividends and capital gains are not taxed). Taxation of consumption has been
supplemented by introduction of value added tax in it's consumption version. The
purpose of introduction of the principle of consumption in the tax system was
neutrality in making economy-related decisions. The principle of neutrality is based
on a concept that maximum prosperity is achieved with market allocation of
resources. In such process, non-neutral taxation can lead to inefficient allocation
of resources. In tax theory, tax neutrality can be achieved by taxing only the spent
part of current income of a taxpayer. Discrimination of savings and investments
is thus avoided. Neutrality between present and future period is particularly
important in the transition countries, suffering from lack of capital. In such cases,
the traditional way of taxation of overall income in which heavy tax burden lies on
income (double taxation) does not yield favorable results (Schmidt, Wissel and
Stöckler, 1996). 
It should be noted that, in other transition countries (Czech
Republic, Poland and Hungary), taxing of overall income is applied instead of
consumption version of taxation of income. This means that interest, dividends
and capital gains are also taxed (IBFD, 1997). Although the impact of the tax
system on growth is hard to isolate (see the theoretical part of this paper), it would
be interesting to analyze the impact of these two ways of taxation on
macroeconomic trends, that is, to establish the extent to which capital (relatively
cheap, in terms of taxes and compared to labor) has had impact on domestic
savings and investments and foreign investments. 
Although Croatia's tax reform has been continual, it can be
divided in two phases. The first phase was characterized with a reform of direct
taxes, while radical modification of indirect taxes took place in the second phase.
The first part of the reform was in 1994, when new income tax and profit tax acts
came into effect, when consumption taxes were introduced and when sales tax
system was simplified. The second part of the reform was prepared in 1995, when
value added tax act was passed, but it did not start before January 1998, when the
act was first enforced. 
168 CROATIAN ECONOMIC SURVEY1996 - 1999
4.1.1 Reform of direct taxes
The reform of direct taxes started in late 1993, when Income
Tax Act and Profit Tax Act were introduced (Official Gazette No. 109/93). They
became effective as of January 1, 1994. An unconventional profit tax that came into
effect at that time was accompanied with a tax on the income of physical persons,
based on consumption principle (Martinez-Vasquez and Boex, 1996) (see Box 2).
This is why tax on income of physical persons is special when compared to the
systems existing elsewhere in the world, because it mostly takes consumption and
not income as its base. Detailed presentation of income tax and profit tax systems
is given below. 
Income tax
One of the fundamental characteristics of the reform of
Croatian tax system, which makes him unique, is that income tax is based on
taxation of consumption. It should be noted that the form applied in taxation of
income is not a clean consumption form, but a hybrid consumption tax
(sometimes it is called personal consumption tax or personal expenditure tax).
Specifically, instead of deducting net savings from the earned income, the unearned
income (interest, dividends, capital gains) is taxed. The goal of the tax reform was
to create a tax system that would stimulate saving. If income is the sum of
consumption and savings, taxation of the overall income means taxation of both
consumption and savings. But, in the consumption tax system, taxation of the
consumption part of current income of a taxpayer does not include taxation of
savings. This is a way to avoid discrimination of savings: consumption today or
consumption tomorrow (i.e. savings) are taxed at the same rate (Owens and
Whitehouse, 1996). This is particularly important in the transition countries where
capital is relatively scarce and the rate of national saving is low, so taxation of the
overall income within which accumulation of capital is also taxed is not easily
accepted. 
Income tax is paid for an income from employment and
self-employment and property income. Some types of income are exempt from
taxation (the ones related to social benefits). Dividends and interest are also tax
exempt. Dividends are considered as taxed already, because they are paid out of a
profit after taxation, while interest on savings represents a deferred consumption,
which is also going to be taxed some time in future. By exempting from tax base
the interest on bank deposits and other financial assets, as well as the dividends on
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which profit tax was paid earlier, the consumption approach to taxation of
individual income is observed. Most of capital gains are also not taxed. 
The introduction of Income Tax Act was accompanied with the
introduction of two rates: 25 percent (on the tax base up to the triple amount of
personal allowance) and 35 percent (on the tax base over the triple amount of
personal allowance). However, amendments of the Act in December 1996 (Official
gazette No. 106/96) reduced the lower rate to 20 percent, applicable as of January
1, 1997. These amendments also increased personal allowance from 700 to 800
kuna (2,000 kuna for pensioners). 
This plain tax with a wide tax base and only few exemptions
allows application of a moderate rate of income tax (see Table 2). However, the
introduction of exemptions started with the amendments of the Act at the end of
1996, when, in contrast to the original version of the Act, the agricultural income
was exempted from taxation. Exemptions are not carried out only by amending
Income Tax Act. Specific tax exemptions are also approved under other acts that
regulate other fields. Thus, tax relieves for the areas liberated in the war were
introduced as a part of Areas of Special State Concern Act (Official Gazette No.
44/96) (personal allowance and protective interest on capital were increased).
Furthermore, Rights of Free-lance Artists and Stimulation of Culture and Art Act
(Official Gazette No. 43/96) also introduced some relieves for free-lance artists. For
instance, donations to artists (to a certain extent) are not considered as income and
are thus not included in the base for taxation of income, either for receivers of a
donation, or for donors. Under Sports Act (Official Gazette No. 111/97), donations
of physical persons of up to 50,000 kuna per year are considered as the
expenditures that reduce the tax base. Introduction of a growing number of
exemptions affects the consistency of an income tax system, narrows the tax base
(which can later lead to increase in tax rates) and opens up a space for new pressure
by specific interest groups for approving a more favorable position as regards to
taxation of income, depending on their lobbying power. 
This move has been facing frequent criticism, claiming that it
has to few tax rates compared with other countries and that personal allowance of
800 kuna is too low. However, the experience of the OECD countries tells us that
the number of tax rates has been dropping in most countries, slowly and
persistently. Income tax is collected by means of decreasing number of tax rates
(with their less and less differing levels), while the upper marginal income tax rate
is also decreasing (Owens and Whitehouse, 1996). Table 2 shows that the number
of rates has dropped in 19 countries (except in Denmark, Switzerland and Turkey,
where it has increased) and that the upper marginal income tax rate has dropped
in all the monitored countries except Turkey. 
170 CROATIAN ECONOMIC SURVEY1996 - 1999
In this respect, our income tax with two rates, of which the
upper marginal one is 35 percent, should not be considered as a deviation from the
trends in the income taxation in market economies. 
Table 2
TAX RATES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
Income tax
Upper marginal Number of income
income tax rate tax rates Profit tax rates VAT rates
1986 1995 1986 1995 1986 1995 1996Atintroduction
Australia 57 47 5 4 49 33 - -
Austria 62 50 10 5 30 34 16 20
Belgium 72 55 12 7 45 39 18 21
Canada 34 31.3 10 4 36 29 7 7
Denmark 45 34.5 3 4 50 34 10 25
Finland 51 39 11 6 33 25 17 22
France 65 56.8 12 6 45 33 13.6 20.6
Greece 63 40 18 3 49 35/40 18 18
Iceland 38.5 38.15 3 2 51 33 24.5 24.5
Ireland 58 48 3 2 50 40 16.3 21
Italy 62 51 9 7 36 36 12 19
Japan 70 50 15 5 43 38 3 3
Luxembourg 57 50 21 17 40 33 8 15
Netherlands 72 60 9 3 42 35 12 17.5
New Zealand 57 33 6 2 45 33 10 12.5
Norway 40 13.7 8 2 28 19 20 23
Spain 66 56 34 16 35 35 12 16
Sweden 50 25 10 1 52 28 11.1 25
Switzerland 13 11.5 6 13 4 to 10 4 to 10 6.5 6.5
Turkey 50 55 6 7 25 25 10 15
UK 60 40 6 3 33 33 10 17.5
USA 50 39.6 14 5 35 35 - -
Czech Rep. - 49 - 5 39 39 - 22
Hungary - 48 - 6 18 18 - 25
Poland - 45 - 3 40 40 - 22
Croatia - 35 - 2 35 35 - 22
Source: Owens and Whitehouse (1996); Jurkoviæ (1998); OECD (1997a).
Personal allowance of 800 kuna (i.e. 9,600 kuna per year) can
be considered as a rather low one. Its increase to a level of one GDP per capita (see
the recommendations in Box 1), that is, approximately 23,000 kuna, would
introduce additional progressiveness in taxation of income, which would neutralize
the regressivity of VAT. 
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BOX 2
PERSONAL CONSUMPTION TAX
The discussion on whether income or personal consumption is a better base for taxation
has been going on for many years, since John Stuart Mill at least. Some economists still
propose that the tax on the income of individuals should replace the tax on the profit of
individuals. A personal consumption tax or personal expenditure tax is a direct tax on the
consumption of individuals, in contrast to a value added tax which is an indirect tax on
consumption. Since                
income = consumption + savings,
the level of consumption can be calculated by deducting overall savings from overall
income. Thus, unlike a universal income tax by which both consumption and savings are
taxed, consumption tax exempts savings from taxation.
However, measuring consumption as a tax base is a problem. A few methods are
proposed for this purpose, of which personal cash flow method is the most frequent one.
Specifically, consumption is obtained by deducting net savings from income. This
essentially means that all cash inflows, such as wages, transfers and any reduction of
savings (e.g. selling of property), should be added up. All investment in savings or
investments is then deducted from this sum. In order to do that, personal accounts in all
banks, pension funds or brokers should be controlled: depositing of assets on these
accounts reduces tax base. Personal consumption would thus be measured on the basis
of cash flow. 
As income tax, consumption tax can also be progressive, so that average tax rates grow
with the increase in consumption. However, some economists, like Robert Hall and Alvin
Rabushka of Stanford University, propose a flat-rate consumption tax, with a single
marginal tax rate for all levels of consumption. Progressiveness would be insured by
recognizing tax exemption for consumption below certain margin, beyond which
consumption tax would be paid. Thus, an average tax rate grows with the increase in
consumption, although marginal tax rate is constant.
Economically, consumption taxes are considered as more efficient than income taxes,
because double taxation is avoided if they are applied. Within an income tax system, the
income is taxed two times: first, when it is earned and second, when the interest on the
part of income that is being saved for some future consumption is taxed. It is therefore
believed that income tax "punishes" savings, thus reducing the funds available for
investing. For their part, lower rates of savings and investments threaten economic
growth. The advantage of consumption taxes is that it does not tax savings, so it is
recommended to the countries with the lack of capital. But, in its pure form, consumption
tax carries along a series of administrative problems, which inhibits its wider use. Instead,
its hybrid forms are used - not taxing all income, but rather exempting the income from
capital (interest, dividends, capital gains). And yet, in practice, taxes that have
consumption as their tax basis are more frequently applied in a form of sales taxes, such
as value added tax. However, since these taxes are indirect ones, they cannot be adapted
to personal conditions of a taxpayer. It is therefore harder to achieve the principle of tax
equity by using them.
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Profit tax
Profit tax was introduced in late 1993 and it acts as a
supplement of the income tax based on the principle of consumption. It has a few
characteristics that have never been used in other countries as such
(Martinez-Vasquez and Boex, 1996). For example, the tax basis is not defined on
the cash-flow principle, as is common when the standard consumption system of
income taxation is applied. In such case, the tax basis for companies is determined
as the difference between overall receipts and overall payments for salaries, supplies
and the full cost of capital investment (defining depreciation and protective interest
is thus not required) (World Bank, 1997). In other words, it is not the difference
between overall receipts and overall payments that constitutes the tax basis, i.e. the
entrepreneurial profit in a business year. The tax basis is the difference between
one's own capital invested in the taxpayer's business at the end and at the
beginning of the year, reduced and enlarged for expenditures and receipts allowed
by the law, respectively. Such definition of the tax basis refers to determining
capital expenditures, i.e. depreciation and protective interest. Protective interest
represents another peculiarity of the Croatian profit tax system. The protective
interest is calculated by compounding one's own capital with protective interest
rate. The protective interest rate is fixed in such a way that the growth rate of
producer prices of industrial products is increased by 5 percent (at the beginning of
the application of the act it was 3 percent) of the real annual interest. The
possibility of reducing the tax basis for the protective interest is adequate for
countries lacking in capital, because accumulation of capital is thus not
encumbered by taxes. Actually, the protective interest rate represents a tax
protection of a part of the real rate of return on capital, thus representing an
incentive for capital investment. Such a reduction of the tax basis for opportunity
cost of capital has been introduced in order to ensure equal treatment in financing
by means of one's own capital and by borrowed capital. 
The profit tax that burdened entrepreneurial profit of domestic
and foreign taxpayers was a flat rate of 25 percent. However, in late 1996, the tax
rate was increased to 35 percent, so that it could be adjusted with the upper income
tax rate (Official Gazette No. 106/99). As a result of the difference between profit
tax rate (25 percent) and the highest income tax rate (35 percent), some taxpayers
escaped from the income tax system to the profit tax system. In order to avoid a
significant increase of the taxpayers' tax liability, the protective interest was
increased from three to five percent and the possibility of accelerated depreciation
was introduced. The originally fixed tax rate was relatively low and it meant a
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certain advantage for foreign investments in relation to other countries of the
region. Increasing the rate to an extent reduced this advantage, because, with a rate
like this, we now fit well among most of the countries listed in Table 2, where rates
mostly range between 30 and 35 percent. However, other amendments of the Act
ensured low taxation of profit. 
As in the taxation of income, other legal provisions here also
introduce certain exemptions. Thus, in addition to relieves in taxation of income,
the Areas of Special State Concern Act also introduces relieves in taxation of profit,
in such way that protective interest is increased to 15 or 20 percent, depending on
the scale of damages in the liberated areas. Under the Sports Act, donations of legal
persons of up to HRK 500,000 per year are deducted from the profit tax basis.
Equally, under the Rights of Free-lance Artists and the Stimulation of Culture and
Art Act, donations of up to a certain level reduce the tax basis for profit tax. 
Besides stimulating investments in fixed capital, low taxation
of capital also has its adverse side in countries like Croatia, where unemployment
rates are high. Compared to highly-taxed labor with a high unemployment rate,
relatively low-taxed capital can hardly lead to a substantial increase in employment
in a short period of time. Same as when income is taxed, introduction of new
exemptions (liberated areas, sports, artists) affects the tax basis, stimulates
increased tax rates (in order to generate equal revenues) and creates the opportunity
for new pressure by various interest groups for privileged status. Besides, the
adopted income taxation of a consumption type has not been implemented in its
pure form. This means that the need for defining capital expenditures (protective
interest and depreciation) introduces a complexity in the system, which makes it
quite probable that distortions in taxation of capital will not be fully eliminated
(World Bank, 1997).
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Table 3
SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS IN CROATIA IN 1998
Contributions Contribution rate(in  percent of gross wage)
Contributions assessed on personal incomes:
  -  pension and disability insurance contribution 10.75%
  -  health insurance contribution 9.00%
  -  children’s allowance contribution 2.20%
  -  employment contribution 0.85%
Contributions assessed on salaries – total 22.8%
Contributions on wages and salaries:
  -  pension and disability insurance contribution 10.75%
  -  health insurance contribution 9.00%
  -  employment contribution 0.85%
Contributions on salaries – total 20.6%
Source: Sirovica (1998)
Contributions
In a larger sense, the system of contributions, or social
insurance system, is a part of the tax system of the general government.
Contributions are used for financing expenditures of pension and disability
insurance, health insurance, children's allowance and employment. This is part of
the taxation system that has yet not undergone substantial changes in Croatia. The
problem is in the large number of privileges inherited from the socialist system.
Since these rights are typically not elastic downwards, reforming social insurance
systems in all countries primarily becomes a social and political problem. The
overall taxation through contributions in Croatia is among the highest in the world
(see Table 7) and it certainly represents a heavy burden for the labor factors, thus
reducing the international competitiveness of Croatian products. Nestiæ (1997)
proposed their reduction, or transferring part of them to the state budget, or even
a full reform of the system of social expenditures. But only a systematic
rationalization of social insurance will bring along a long-term final relieve from
excessive contributions. As of 1 February 1998, the contributions on wages and
salaries and contributions assessed on personal incomes have been paid on salaries
at the total rate of 43.4 percent (Sirovica, 1998).
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The so-called war tax was introduced the same year. In addition to the existing rates10
of turnover tax on goods and services, the whole retail trade was taxed at a rate of 10
percent.
The cascade effect is hard to estimate: some authors (Daliæ, Madžareviæ and Nestiæ,11
1996) estimate it was 1 percent, while others (Krelove, Temprano-Arroyo and
Schenone, 1997) believe it amounts around  4.6 percent. The cascade effects occurred
because taxpayers still had to purchase passenger vehicles, office furniture, stationery
and liquid fuels and lubricants at retail prices.
4.1.2 Reform of indirect taxes
Value Added Tax
The reform of indirect taxes was implemented gradually, by
means of repeated amendments of the existing sales tax system, which was based
on single-stage sales tax in retail trade. The goal of these reforms was to prepare the
ground for the VAT system by simplifying the existing Sales Tax on Goods and
Services Act (Official Gazette No. 36/91):
        a) tax rates were gradually reduced, so that overall tax rate for
products was reduced from its maximum of as high as 50
percent in 1992  to 26.2 percent (15 percent plus 10 percent of10
sales tax in retail trade), as it was when VAT was introduced in
early 1998,
        b) the number of tax brackets was reduced from eight for products
and six for services down to only four for products and one for
services,
        c) taxation of raw material and equipment was abolished in order
to reduce the cascade effect and bring the taxation system
nearer to modern taxation of final consumption. Although the
goal was to bring sales tax closer to the single-phase final
consumption tax, full correction of the tax distortions caused by
tax cascading actually failed ,11
        d) excise taxes on tobacco and oil products, alcohol and
non-alcohol beverages, beer and motor vehicles were
introduced in July 1994.
Although these changes were important in the modernization
of the taxation of consumption, the enactment of the Value Added Tax Act
(Official Gazette No. 47/95) on 12 July 1995 was nevertheless the most important
pillar of the reform of indirect taxes. The Value Added Tax Act was supposed to
replace the single-phase sales tax system as of 1st January 1997, but its application
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was postponed for a year, that is for 1st January 1998. The gradual approach and
caution in the implementation of the reform are understandable if we keep in mind
that they represent the most important revenue of the central government budget
(in 1993, as much as 72 percent tax revenues of the state budget came from sales
tax).
By the introduction of VAT, a sales tax with five tax rates (four
for products and one for services) has been replaced by a flat rate of taxation of 22
percent on all products and services in the final consumption. By the introduction
of VAT, overall sales tax rate was thus reduced from 26.5 percent to 22 percent, at
which all products and services are taxed. According to the Value Added Tax Act,
zero rate of VAT is not applied in Croatia (except for products for export) and only
a few usual exemptions are envisaged: lease of housing space, services of banks and
savings banks, insurance and re-insurance, medical and dental services, social
welfare and child welfare and services in education, religion and culture. Besides
these exemptions, government administration bodies, unions, political parties and
chambers are also exempt from the VAT system; VAT is also not paid for
transactions in securities and shares in a business. VAT is based on a consumption
type (gross investments are not taxed), on a destination principle (export is taxed
at zero rate and is thus fully exempt from VAT, while imported goods are taxed on
the basis of the place of spending, that is, with the domestic VAT), and on a credit
method of calculation of VAT, which actually never calculates value added, but
rather calculates the amount of VAT based on incoming and outgoing invoices.
These fundamental determinants of the Croatian VAT Act tell
us that this solution fully complies with the recommendations for a successful tax
reform. Neutrality of the tax, its economic nature and simplicity of collecting and
the range of exemptions are all reduced to a minimum, while a zero rate is applied
to export only. 
Strong as it is, the pressures for introduction of several tax rates
in order to relieve regressivity of VAT has failed so far. In modern fiscal systems,
regressivity of VAT is relieved by increased progressiveness of other tax forms or
direct transfers to vulnerable categories of the population. Such method of
achieving vertical equity is much more efficient than achieving the same goal with
a larger number of VAT rates: fewer distortions are introduced to the system,
assistance goes to those who really need it, indirect subsidizing of the rich is
avoided, the costs of tax collection for both tax administration and taxpayers are
reduced and the pressure of individual interest groups for introduction of a lower
rate is avoided (Kesner-Škreb, 1996).
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An analysis of household budgets, that is to be carried out in Croatia soon, will enable12
this type of research.
It should be noted that, due to the above reasons, all pressures
for the introduction of several rates will be resisted. The real proportion of the
regressive effect of VAT should be examined and put in relation to other tax forms
and social transfers . Only then will competent evaluation of regressivity of the tax12
system in Croatia be possible. But it does not necessarily have to be as big as some
of its critics think it is. Regressivity should be observed in terms of dynamics and
in a long-term sense, not just statically and in a short-term sense. First,
dynamically, VAT is a consumption tax that, in its consumption form, stimulates
investment and growth. A faster growth brings along increase in salaries and
employment rate, which also makes the incomes of the poor to grow. Second,
regressivity can also be observed in the long-term. At the moment when its
spending starts in a flat-rate VAT system, the part of the income that was saved
proportionally encumbers the spending of wealthy or poor citizens. Since saving is
merely a postponed spending, it means that it will be taxed sooner or later - that
is, it will become subject to VAT once it turns into spending. This way, the wealthy
are not exempt from sales tax eventually, although they save more than the poor.
They pay it when they turn their savings into spending. They will probably turn
their savings into spending not before the end of their lives or their heirs will do it;
however, at that moment, their spending will be taxed at the same rate as the
spending of the poor. This is why regressivity has a different meaning when
observed with respect to an income of one's lifetime or of future generations and
not just with respect to current income. In such case, VAT does not seem to be
regressive, but fully balanced with respect to a lifetime income, if we presume zero
savings at the end of life (Wagner and Schmidt, 1996). In contrast to a short-term
observation, which only considers the household budget of one wealthy and one
poor citizen at one moment, this long-term observation fully changes the concept
of regressivity of VAT.
The first months of application of VAT have shown that, after
all initial disagreements, this tax has become more and more accepted, the inflow
to the budget has been growing beyond any expectations, price increase has not
been dramatic and their reduction is expected in the following months, the
underground economy has been gradually entering the VAT system, so a decrease
in tax evasion is expected. These trends will probably allow imminent reduction of
the relatively high (compared to other countries) rate of 22 percent (see Table 2).
This would lead to additional tax relieves and reduction of tax distortions. 
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The Croatian tax system is often criticized on the grounds that
it relies on indirect taxes too much (in 1995, in the OECD countries, 6.6 percent
of GDP accounts for sales tax without expenditure tax; in Croatia, it is 13 percent
(see Table 6)). However, this situation has a few advantages for Croatia. That is,
higher taxation with VAT allows export products to be stripped off domestic taxes
to a larger extent, thus becoming more competitive in the international market.
Same as contributions, income taxes and profit taxes cannot be deducted from the
value of an export product and so they "move" to the international market, thus
making a domestic product more costly. Income taxes and profit taxes in the
Croatian system are relatively low. However, extremely high social security
contributions (in 1995, they were 9.8 percent of GDP in the OECD countries and
18.5 percent in Croatia (see Table 6)) make it a large burden for export products
(and not only them), because they cannot be excluded from their price.
Excise taxes
Excise taxes on oil derivatives, tobacco products, beer,
non-alcoholic beverages, alcohol and automobiles were introduced in July 1994
(Official Gazette No. 51/94). It should be noted that expenditure excise taxes on
coffee have been in place since 1993 (Official Gazette No. 66/93). At the end of
1997, excise taxes on beer, non-alcoholic beverages, automobiles (Official Gazette
No. 139/97) were changed, as well as on oil derivatives (Official Gazette No. 51/94).
These changes abolished the increased excise taxes on imported beer and
non-alcoholic beverages, which equalized the tax status of imported and domestic
products. However, excise taxes on tobacco have not been changed yet, so the
imported tobacco has almost double excise tax than the domestic one. This practice
should change, so that domestic  industry is not protected by taxes (see Box 3.1).
Excise taxes have also been extended to aircraft and vessels, which increased the
number of products subject to excise taxes. Taxation of luxurious products adds to
the progressivity of a tax system with a flat rate of VAT. Therefore, the number of
luxurious products subject to excise tax should not be reduced. Although, taxation
of negative externalities (oil derivatives, tobacco and alcohol) should not be changed
because it reduces their spending. However, it should be re-examined whether
excise taxes on non-alcoholic beverages are justified.
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4.2. Analysis of Croatia's tax revenues
In the beginning, a few notes about the information on tax
revenue should be made in order to ensure easier comprehension of this section.
In Croatia, the overall tax revenue is collected on three levels: they include taxes in
the central government budget, taxes of the budgets of local government and
contributions of extra-budgetary funds. When contributions of the extra-budgetary
funds are added up to the central government budget taxes, we obtain the overall
tax revenue (taxes and contributions) of the central government. The overall tax
revenue can be presented on both the consolidated and the unconsolidated basis.
On the third level, taxes are collected in local government units. So, when taxes on
the local level are added up to the overall taxes of the central government (taxes of
the central government budget and contributions of extra-budgetary funds), this
gives us the information on the overall tax revenue of the general government. It
can also be consolidated or unconsolidated. In the text, as well as in the tables, we
will always indicate what information we refer to.
Tax revenues of central government budget
The economic truism says: a government needs to collect
budgetary revenues if it wants to finance budget expenditures. Taxes are the main
form of collecting budgetary funds. They account for over 90 percent of the central
government budget in Croatia, while non-tax revenues, capital revenues and grants
representing other budget sources account for the remaining 10 percent of funds.
The past years have seen a fast growth of the tax burden, as
measured by the share of tax revenues of the central government budget in GDP
(Table 4 and Figure 2). While 26.6 percent of GDP was allocated by means of taxes
in 1997, it was only 14.8 percent of GDP in 1991. This means that the tax burden
had almost doubled in five years. However, the data from the period 1991-1993
cannot be considered as reliable, because of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, a
large-scale war, economic instability and hyperinflation, and unreliable fiscal
statistics and statistics of gross domestic product. Besides, similar to expenditure
taxes, the laws on income tax and the profit tax did not start to apply before 1994.
Thus, the data can be considered as reliable for analyses only as of 1994.
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Table 4
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If tax liability is settled within a certain period of time elapsing between the time when13
a tax was generated and the time of payment, the real value of collected taxes will be
higher at the time of collection than at the moment the liability was generated
(Švaljek, 1995, page 68).
They have turned out to be a particularly abundant source of revenues; therefore, they14






IN GDP (in %)
A sudden leap of the share of taxes in GDP takes place in 1994
- of as much as 6.7 percentage points (from 18.9 percent in 1993 to 25.6 percent
in 1994). This leap of tax revenues can be explained by a number of reasons. First,
1994 was the first year of the stabilization program when prices dropped without
notice (retail prices were 2.98 percent lower than in 1993). This was the time of the
inverse Olivera -Tanzi effect, that is, the time of real increase of tax revenues.13
Second, the implementation of the Income Tax and Profit Tax Act started at the
beginning of that year, so tax revenues from this source grew by 2.2 percentage
points. Third, in the middle of the same year, excise taxes  were introduced.14
Fourth, the financial police, established in 1992 (Financial Police Act, Official
gazette No. 89/92), became organized by that time, which led to more regular
collection of tax revenues. Fifth, a large number of taxpayers were included in the
sales tax system, although tax rates were lowered and tax brackets within a tax
were reduced (Fabijanèiæ and Barac, 1996).
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Pension and disability insurance fund, health insurance fund, employment fund,15
children's allowance assets and Hrvatska vodoprivreda (Croatian Water Resources
Management Company).
The increase in the share of tax revenues in GDP continued in
1995, when it reached its maximum of 26.9 percent. After the maximum reached
in 1995, the share of taxes in GDP slowly started to drop (by 0.3 percentage points
compared to the previous year when it was at its maximum). This drop was a
result of the lowering of the basic sales tax rate from 20 percent to 15 percent,
which also caused reduction of the average burden of the turnover in the ultimate
consumption from 32 percent to 26.5 percent. The same tendency continued in
1997, i.e. the share of tax revenues stabilized at the level of 26.6 percent of GDP.
The dynamics of taxes and GDP can also be analyzed by means
of tax elasticity, which is measured as the percentage of change of taxes divided by
the percentage of change of GDP over a period of time (in this case - one year). Tax
elasticity over 1.0 indicates that the growth of tax revenues is faster than the
growth of GDP. Tax elasticity was over 1.0 in the period 1992-1995, with its
maximum of 1.68 in 1994 (Table 4). This means that taxes in this period grew
faster than GDP, with the fastest growth recorded in 1994, as compared to 1993.
After 1995, the proportions of tax elasticity fell below 1.0, which indicates that the
growth of GDP was faster than the growth of tax revenues. Similar trends also have
marginal tax rates that measure absolute tax growth compared to absolute GDP
growth in one period (in this case - one year). The marginal tax rate reached its
highest level in 1995. In that year, 37.7 percent of GDP growth was allocated for
taxes, unlike in 1992, when the percentage of GDP allocated for taxes was almost
half less, i.e. only 19.1 percent. After 1995, marginal allocation for taxes dropped
in 1996 and grew again in 1997, when tax growth exceeded GDP growth, which
also made the marginal tax rate higher. 
Taxes and social security contributions
In order to perceive the overall tax burden in addition to taxes,
the amount of contributions to extra-budgetary funds  should also be taken into15
account. After the drop from 19.5 percent in 1991 to 12.9 percent in 1993, the
share of the contributions in GDP continued to grow once more and again reached
the level of 19 percent in 1997 (see Table 5). Taxes after all are a dominant way of
financing the central government: after 1992, some 60 percent of revenues have
continually been collected through taxes and 40 percent through contributions. The
overall tax and contribution burden on the central government after a sudden
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The Ministry of Finance has been providing these data since 1994. The local16
government budgets make up around 3 percent of GDP on a consolidated basis and
around 7 percent of GDP on a unconsolidated basis.
increase from 31.8 percent of GDP in 1993 to 42.5 percent of GDP in 1994
continues to grow, reaching 45.6 percent of GDP in 1997 (unconsolidated data).
The overall tax and contribution burden was thus almost 14 percentage points of
GDP higher than in the early nineties. Defense expenditures during the war,
numerous displaced persons and refugees and wide-ranging social rights inherited
from the abandoned socialist system are only some of the budget expenditures that
caused great pressure on tax and contribution growth in those years. An
extenuating circumstance was the stabilization of prices, which ensured the
functioning of the inverse Tanzi-Olivera effect and growth of real tax revenues
without major interference in the tax system. 
So far we have analyzed the data on the central government
level. This means the data that include the state budget taxes and extra-budgetary
funds contributions. All these data were unconsolidated. But if we observe the data
for the general government which, besides the state budget and extra-budgetary
funds, also contain the tax revenues of local government units, and if the data are
consolidated, the situation is very similar. Thus, the allocation of GDP on the
general consolidated state level by means of taxes and contributions was as follows:
43.19 percent in 1994, 44.40 percent in 1995 and 44.72 percent in 1996 (Ministry
of Finance, 1998) .16
Compared levels of tax revenues of Croatia
and some other countries
The level of burden of tax revenues in Croatia should be
compared with the same level in other transition countries, as well as in countries
with a market economy. This could answer the question whether Croatian citizens
pay relatively high taxes. The tax burden in Croatia will be compared with the
burden in the advanced transition countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland (they also have similar levels of income per capita) and the neighboring
countries that are, at the same time, Croatia's main trading partners: Austria, Italy
and Germany. The data are shown in Table 6.
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Table 5
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The level of taxation (including taxes and contributions) in
transition countries was high at the beginning of the transition process in 1989. In
almost all of these observed countries, the share of taxes and contributions in GDP
largely exceeded 50 percent, except for Poland, where the taxation level was the
lowest (41.5 percent of GDP) (IMF, 1996).
When data on tax revenues in 1995 are compared, it is obvious
that the tax burden was mostly reduced in Hungary, bringing it down to the level
of the tax burden in Germany. Poland and the Czech Republic are less successful
in this process and their tax burden only slightly differs from the burden in Croatia.
These countries also have similar GDP per capita and similar transition costs as
Croatia, which also makes their tax burden similar. The basic difference is in the
direction of movement: while these transition countries have continually been
lowering the share of taxes in their GDP, the share of taxes in GDP in Croatia has
been continually growing. 
Table 6
SHARE OF TAXES AND SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS
IN GDP IN SELECTED COUNTRIES IN 1995 ( percent)
  Total  Contributions  Income   Profit   Sales   Excise   Other  tax   tax   tax   taxes   taxes
Czech Rep. 44.3 5.5 5.4 18.1 7.6 5.9 44.3
Hungary 39.2 6.5 1.9 12.0 8.6 8.9 39.2
Poland 42.7 9.8 3.3 13.0 7.3 7.5 42.7
Average 42.1 7.3 3.5 14.4 7.8 7.4 42.1
Austria 42.4 8.8 1.6 15.4 7.7 3.4 42.4
Italy 41.3 10.8 3.6 13.1 5.7 4.6 41.3
Germany 39.2 10.7 1.1 15.4 6.8 3.7 39.2
Average 41.0 10.1 2.1 14.6 6.7 3.9 41.0
EU 41.8 11.3 2.9 12.3 7.3 4.8 41.8
OECD 37.4 10.4 3.0 9.8 6.6 4.7 37.4
Croatia 45.4 3.6 1.0 18.5 13.0 5.0 45.4
Source: OECD (1997); Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia
If the tax burden in transition countries is compared with the
burden in the developed market economies, it can be concluded that it is still high
in the former. Thus, the overall tax burden in the OECD countries in 1995 was
37.4 percent of GDP on average, while the burden of the overall budgetary revenues
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We have already mentioned that the data from the early nineties are not fully reliable,17
so they are only used for orientation here.
in the observed transition countries was 42.1 percent on average. In countries of
the European Union the tax burden (41.8 percent) is higher than in the OECD
countries and is close to the burden in transition countries. Most of the European
Union members are prosperous countries where social standards are high. For this
reason, the rights that are financed by taxes and contributions are of a relatively
wide range. However, when the levels of taxation in the OECD and the EU
countries are observed during a longer period, it can be noticed that they also grow.
Thus, the average tax burden in the OECD in 1980 was 34.1 percent (37.4 percent
in 1995); in the EU it was 37.7 percent (41.8 percent in 1995). This means that it
increased by three to four percentage points in both groups of countries (OECD,
1997).
Croatia left Yugoslavia with a relatively low share of taxes in
GDP, so that in 1991 it was by far the lowest  (34.3 percent of GDP) when17
compared to other transition countries. But, while the share of taxes in GDP in
other transition countries was dropping, in Croatia it was growing. Such a trend of
the share of tax revenues in GDP was relatively atypical, as compared to other
transition countries that continually kept reducing their shares. However, this
should not be surprising, since the social and economic conditions in Croatia were
also atypical. With its share of taxes in GDP of 45.5 percent in 1995
(unconsolidated central government) and 44.4 percent (consolidated general
government), Croatia can be considered as a country with a relatively high tax
burden. It is the highest among the observed countries and groups of countries:
around 2.3 percentage points higher than in transition countries; 2.6 percentage
points higher than in the countries of the European Union; and as much as 7
percentage points higher than in the OECD countries (see Table 6).
The overall tax burden in Croatia is certainly high, which places
it among the countries with an above-average tax burden: of the OECD countries,
only Denmark (51.3 percent), Sweden (49.7 percent), Finland (46.5 percent),
Belgium (46.5 percent) and France (44.5 percent) allocated higher percentage of
GDP for tax purposes than Croatia (see Table 7). All the remaining 24 countries
were allocating less GDP for tax purposes, although they have relatively higher
levels of GDP per capita. 
However, the countries that allocate a percentage of taxes similar
to Croatia's (such as France or Belgium), also allocate much higher absolute
amount of taxes per capita than Croatia (France - 6.7 times higher; Belgium - 7
times higher). Naturally, these countries are much wealthier and have much higher
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gross domestic products. This way, the same percentage of the allocation of GDP
through taxes can actually mean very different amounts of taxes per capita, which
also means a different volume and quality of public services. 
Table 7
SHARE OF TAXES AND SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS
IN GDP IN THE OECD COUNTRIES IN 1995 
Taxes and Taxes per GDP per
contributions capita (US$) capita (US$)Taxes Contributions
Denmark 49.7 35.2 14.5 12,968 23,750
Sweden 46.5 33.6 12.8 11,376 20,580
Finland 46.5 31.1 15.4 12,339 24,710
Belgium 44.5 25.2 19.3 11,762 24,990
France 44.3 26.3 18.1 2,024 3,870
Czech Rep. 44.0 32.2 11.8 18,607 41,210
Luxembourg 44.0 25.6 18.4 11,253 24,000
The Netherlands 42.7 29.7 13.0 1,304 2,790
Poland 42.4 27.1 15.4 12,166 26,890
Austria 41.5 31.8 9.8 13,977 31,250
Norway 41.4 27.5 13.9 3,700 8,210
Greece 41.3 28.2 13.1 7,842 19,020
Italy 39.2 27.2 12.0 1,695 4,120
Hungary 39.2 23.8 15.4 11,573 27,510
Germany 38.2 38.2 - 6,369 14,340
New Zealand 37.2 31.0 6.2 7,147 19,380
Canada 35.3 29.0 6.3 6,659 18,700
Great Britain 34.0 21.7 12.3 4,850 13,580
Spain 33.9 21.3 12.7 14,673 40,630
Switzerland 33.8 24.7 9.1 3,512 9,740
Portugal 33.8 28.9 4.9 6,082 14,710
Ireland 31.2 28.6 2.5 8,154 24,950
Iceland 30.9 30.9 - 6,131 18,720
Australia 28.5 18.1 10.4 11,789 39,640
Japan 27.9 20.9 7.0 7,614 26,980
USA 22.5 19.8 2.7 619 2,780
Turkey 22.3 20.5 1.8 2,267 9,700
S. Korea 16.0 13.3 2.7 484 3,320
Mexico
Croatia (consolidated
general government) 44.4 25.9 18.5 1,750 3,250
Source: OECD (1997); World Bank (1997a); Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia
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However, if we break down the overall tax burden into a tax
burden and a contribution burden, the situation becomes somewhat different. The
tax burden is found to be even below the level of an average tax burden in the
OECD and EU countries. What makes Croatia distinctive is its high contribution
burden, which is almost twice as high as in the OECD countries and around 50
percent higher than the average burden in the EU countries. This indicates that
problems lie in restructuring of the extra-budgetary fund expenditures. This could
be used for reducing the overall tax burden to a reasonable level. 
It is interesting to show to what extent the tax burden in
Croatia is higher than its potential for tax collection. To this end, we will quote the
work of Barbone and Polack (1996), who tried to use a model in order to establish
tax capacities of specific transition countries (including Croatia) and compare them
with the real tax burdens. In a regression model they used the data for 47 countries
during the 1993/94 period. The independent variables in the regressions that are
supposed to explain the capability of tax collection are: GDP per capita (based on
purchasing power), the share of industry in GDP, the share of export in GDP, the
share of urban population, the share of the population with secondary education,
the share of public debt in GDP, gross domestic savings and investments. They
then applied the model to transition countries. By comparing regressive anticipated
tax revenues and real tax revenues, they obtained the tax strain index. If this index
is higher than one, it warns that the tax capacity of a country is overstrained.
According to their calculations, the share of the anticipated taxes in GDP in
Croatia in the 1993/94 period was 30.7 percent. According to the same source,
Croatia was actually collecting much more taxes, i.e. 41.6 percent of GDP. For this
reason, the tax strain index (the share of the taxes actually collected divided by the
share of the anticipated taxes in GDP) is 1.36. This means that Croatia collects 36
percent of taxes more than can be afforded by the potentials of its economy. At the
same time, Hungary was collecting 75 percent, the Czech Republic 34 percent and
Poland 59 percent of taxes above the tax capacity anticipated by the model. 
Tax distortions
In the theoretical part of the paper it was established that a high
tax burden with which high budgetary expenditures are financed leads to tax
distortions, i.e. inefficient economy. In this way, the "large" government that
requires high taxes also brings large distortions into the system. The result of such
distortions is inefficient allocation of resources and, finally, lower growth. The
question is: what is the size of these tax distortions that a "large" government like
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The authors define fast-growing countries as developing countries with medium18
income and population over 1 million and whose income per capita grows at an
annual rate of 4 percent or higher, in two periods: 1985-90 and 1990-94. As Table 8
indicates, these are mostly so-called Asian tigers, which experienced a major crisis in
1997. This indicates the complexity of the process of growth. Low tax burden of an
economy is not the only factor that ensures accelerated growth.
in Croatia brings into its economy. 
Measuring tax distortions is a complex job that requires
familiarity with the stimulating effects of the overall tax system, not just individual
kinds of taxes. In order to do it accurately, one should know marginal tax rates of
all kinds of taxes for all income categories of the population. A model of tax shifting
would also be needed, in order to establish the impact of taxes on the general
balance. Since such an accurate calculation of tax distortions is a complex task
burdened with a series of technical problems, some estimates of their size could be
used. Thus, a much simpler but also less accurate approach could be used as an
approximation of tax distortions: calculation of the tax burden of labor, as Sachs
and Warner did in their work (1996). It is calculated in such way that the tax wedge
between labor cost of a company and the real net wage of a worker with average
income is established. 
Four components are important for calculating this tax wedge:
payroll tax paid by the company, payroll tax paid by the worker, income tax and
value added tax (which increases the price of goods in the ultimate consumption).
Let the price before taxation be P and the wage before taxation W. The nominal net
wage of a worker is W (1- J() (1 - JDT), where J( is marginal income tax rate and
JDT is payroll tax paid by the worker. Since P is the price level before taxation and
the level of consumer prices is P(1 + JL), where JL is consumption tax rate (or value
added tax rate), we can express the net real wage with W (1- J() (1 - JDT)/ P(1 + JL).
The cost of labor for the company, deflated by the price level P, is W (1 + JDf)/ P,
where JDf is the rate of payroll tax paid by the company. For example, if taxes are
of such amount that the company pays twice as much as the net real wage, we say
that the tax wedge is 100 percent, because the cost of labor is 100 percent above the
real net wage. More precisely, tax wedge is defined as 100 * ((cost of labor)/ (real net
wage) - 1). Thus, tax wedge is:
(4)  IT = ”((1+ JDf)(1+ JL)/(1- J()(1 - JDT))-1› * 100
Table 8 shows tax wedges for some transition countries, for a
group of fast-growing countries  and for Croatia. The fast-growing countries have18
low tax wedges, which means that they also have low tax distortions in the labor
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market. Since we have approximated the size of the overall tax distortions with the
tax distortions in the labor market (not having a better method), we can assume
that the overall tax distortions in these countries are also low. In these countries,
a low tax burden (which is indicated by tax rates in Table 8) has lead to low
distortions in the market allocation of resources. 
Table 8
TAX WEDGES IN 1994
Income tax rate Payroll tax






Chile 5.0 35.0 9.0 18.0 35.7
Hong Kong 2.0 17.0 0.0 0.0 2.0
South Korea 9.0 35.0 8.0 10.0 31.4
Malaysia 10.0 40.0 23.0 10.0 53.8
Mauritius n.a. n.a. 9.0 n.a. n.a.
Singapore 15.0 27.0 0.0 1.0 18.8
Taiwan 6.0 25.0 6.0 5.0 18.9
Thailand 5.0 30.0 5.0 7.0 18.4
Transition countries
Czech Republic 20.0 41.0 42.0 23.0 128.5
Poland 21.0 40.0 48.0 22.0 128.5
Hungary 35.0 36.0 61.0 25.0 223.8
Croatia 35.0 35.0 43.4 22.0 193.2f
a Marginal income tax rate of the tax bracket representing GDP per capita.
b Normally it is a single rate. If there are more than one, the maximal one is used.
c The sum of contribution rates for the company and for the worker, that finance
unemployment, health care system, insurance and pensions.
d The rate at which most of the goods and services are taxed. 
e Cost of labor for the company as a percentage of the real net wage of an average worker,
calculated by the formula in the text above.
f Calculated by rates in effect since 1998.
Source: Sachs and Warner (1996, p. 14) and the author's calculation.
In transition countries, distortions in the labor market are much
higher. For example, in the extreme cases of Hungary and Hong Kong -  the
distortion in Hungary is almost one hundred times higher than in Hong Kong.
High distortions discourage the labor market in many ways: higher unemployment,
lower attendance record, temporary withdrawal from the labor market, early
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Hungary has very high contributions, which include employer's contributions to social19
security fund (44 percent), unemployment fund (7 percent), re-training fund (1.5
percent), as well as workers' contributions to social security fund (10 percent).
retirement and growth of the underground economy. It is therefore not surprising
that unemployment rates in fast-growing countries are low. 
The distortion in Croatian labor market before the introduction
of value added tax was as much as 204 percent, while after the introduction of
value added tax in 1998 it dropped to 193.2 percent. Compared with other
countries, it is a very high distortion - higher even than in the Czech Republic and
Poland, but lower than in Hungary . In Croatia and in the majority of transition19
countries, profit tax rates and sales tax rates are relatively high as compared to
fast-growing countries. Payroll tax rates and payroll contribution rates are
particularly high. In fast-growing countries these rates are much lower, so tax
distortions are also lower.
The World Bank (1996) also estimates that the excess tax
burden in transition countries is high and is drawing closer to the burden in
developing countries. According to the World Bank, high tax distortions in
transition countries are the result of a number of factors:
        a) Tax rates are often high. In countries with a large number of
emerging small companies and with mostly inefficient tax
administration, high taxes encourage tax evasion and transition
to unofficial economy. For example, recent research indicates
that tax evasion in Croatia in 1996 was between 9 - 15 percent
of the estimated GDP, whereas the share of unofficial economy
was as much as 25 percent (Madžareviæ, 1997). Since an
unofficial market below 10 percent of GDP can be considered
to be small and the one above 30 percent large (Sachs and
Warner, 1996), Croatia with 25 percent certainly belongs to a
group of countries with a large unofficial economy. Since
income tax rate and profit tax rate are relatively low, it was
mostly the high sales tax that induced taxpayers to evade taxes
and that created an excess  tax burden. Introduction of the VAT
reduced the tax distortions.
        b) High payroll taxes in the form of social security contributions
for social expenditures are high. The heavy burden of these tax
payments makes entrepreneurs employ fewer people, invest less
and move to the gray zone. The reform of the pension system,
which usually means transition to a system in which
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contributors pay for their future pensions, should relieve the
entrepreneurs' burden. The burden of contributions is
comparatively high. This is why evasion of contributions for
employees is the second highest, next to evasion of sales tax. 
        c) There are pressures for the introduction of tax relieves and tax
rate benefits for specific activities and sectors. This creates the
need for increased taxation of other activities. Such a diverse
treatment of the taxpayers lowers the tax revenues of the
budget, complicates tax administration and distorts the
allocation of resources. The introduction of tax relieves to the
Croatian tax system in 1996 (liberated areas, free-lance artists,
sportsmen, war veterans) and the pressure to increase the
number of value added tax rates (instead of statutory flat rate for
all goods and services) have threatened its initial good aspects.
In the case of Croatia, we can say that the introduction of VAT
has increased economic efficiency and that income tax rate and profit tax rate are
relatively low. The highest distortions are thus the result of high contributions. The
efficiency of the tax system is additionally affected by the introduction of new tax
relieves benefits. 
Tax revenue structure
The structure of taxation in Croatia has undergone substantial
changes. A few tendencies in the movement of the main categories of tax revenues
can be seen (see Table 9).
First, relative importance of indirect taxes (sales tax,
consumption tax and customs duty) in the government budget is growing. Indirect
taxes have more than tripled its share in GDP: from 9 percent in 1991 to 21.4
percent in 1997. While 60.9 percent of total tax revenues of the central government
budget were collected by means of these taxes in 1991, this percentage grew to as
much as 80 percent in 1997. As compared to other countries, relatively large
amounts of tax revenues are collected by means of indirect taxes, i.e. sales tax and
consumption taxes. The amount of tax revenues collected by means of sales tax
and consumption taxes in 1995 was 18 percent of GDP; at the same time, it was
11.3 percent of GDP in the OECD countries and an average of 15.2 percent of
GDP in the observed transition countries. This ratio does not have to be that
unfavorable. As has been said in the first part, export products can be largely
tax-exempted by taxation of consumption, particularly after introduction of VAT.
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Due to unavailable data from national account the amount of the effective profit tax20
rate cannot be specified with certainty.
Specifically, in the case of export products, the tax paid on inputs can be deducted
and they can reach the international market free of domestic consumption tax.
However, it is not possible to exempt export products from direct taxes, i.e. income
tax, profit tax and contribution. In this way, these taxes are included in the price
of an export product. 
As regards to indirect taxes, the sales tax in the 1991-1997
period was the most dynamic category and its share grew from 7.8 percent to 17.4
percent of GDP. With the introduction of VAT and a good realization of budget at
the beginning of 1998, it can be expected that the relative importance of this tax
will grow even more. Since the cascade effect was annulled by switching from the
single -phase tax in retail trade to the multi-phase VAT and since VAT is of a
neutral character, the tax distortions that existed until the end of 1997 have been
reduced. VAT therefore leads to the reduction of dead weight loss and brings into
an economic system a higher level of efficiency in the allocation of resources. This
way, the prevailing part of the budget is filled by means of the least distorting tax,
which can only have a positive effect on growth. 
Second, direct taxes have a relatively small role in Croatia. Profit
tax is almost negligible in the central government budget: its share in GDP was in
the region of 1 percent throughout the nineties. After the application of the new
Income Tax Act in 1994, the share of income tax in GDP stabilized at around 3.6
percent of GDP. The totaled share of income tax and profit tax in GDP in Croatia
is still almost three times lower than such a share in the OECD countries and half
as much as the average in the transition countries. Given the small share of these
taxes in GDP, we can say that their distorting effect is also relatively small. This
particularly refers to profit tax, which has a really small share in GDP. This also
indicates a very low effective profit tax rate , which stimulates investments and20
growth. The same can also be said for income tax. For this reason, it is possible to
undertake measures to increase equity and decrease regressivity of VAT by means
of income tax. This primarily means an increase of personal allowance and a
possibility to introduce an additional marginal tax rate. This would improve the
equity of the tax system without substantially affecting the efficiency, while the
state budget would lose relatively small revenues.
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Table 9
STRUCTURE OF TAXES OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
(UNCONSOLIDATED)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Share in GDP
Taxes and contributions 34.3 31.7 31.8 42.5 45.4 45.5 45.6
     Tax revenues 14.8 18.4 18.9 25.6 26.9 26.6 26.6
     Direct taxes 25.3 16.4 15.3 21.4 23.2 24.2 24.2
          Contributions 19.5 13.2 12.9 16.9 18.5 18.9 19.0
          Income tax 4.8 2.6 1.7 3.7 3.6 3.9 3.5
          Profit tax 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.5
          Property tax 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
     Indirect taxes 9.0 15.3 16.5 21.1 22.2 21.3 21.4
          Sales tax on goods and services 7.8 11.6 13.5 17.1 18.0 17.6 17.4
          Sales tax - - - 15.0 13.0 12.6 12.8
          Excise taxes - - - 2.1 5.0 5.0 4.6
     Tax on international trade 1.2 3.6 2.9 4.0 4.0 3.7 4.0
     Other taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0
Structure of tax revenues
Taxes and contributions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
     Direct taxes 73.8 51.8 48.2 50.4 51.1 53.2 53.1
          Contributions 57.0 41.8 40.7 39.8 40.7 41.6 41.7
          Income tax 14.0 8.1 5.4 8.6 7.8 8.6 7.6
          Profit tax 2.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.3 2.6 3.3
          Property tax 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5
     Indirect taxes 26.2 48.2 51.8 49.6 48.9 46.8 46.9
          Sales tax on goods and services 22.8 36.7 42.6 40.1 39.7 38.6 38.2
          Sales tax 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.2 28.6 27.7 28.2
          Excise taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.9 11.1 11.0 10.0
     Tax on international trade 3.4 11.5 9.2 9.4 8.8 8.1 8.7
     Other taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1
Source: Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia.
Third, after lowering their share in GDP in the 1991-1993
period, the contributions to extra-budgetary funds started to grow again and they
accounted for 19 percent of GDP in 1997. The pressure of the expenditure side of
the funds budget does not allow any essential modifications of contribution rates.
The contributions in Croatia are twice as high (18.5 percent of GDP in 1995 as
opposed to 9.8 percent) than in the OECD countries (Table 6). Besides the sales
tax, contributions are the most important source of revenues of the central
government. Sales tax and contributions account for almost 70 percent of the
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central government budget (unconsolidated). Pressure for more abundant financial
support to social needs and war-affected areas is neutralized by high contribution
rates which are very inelastic in a downward direction. The suggestions that part
of the expenditures of the funds that do not contribute to redistribution of revenues
should be shifted to the central government budget, thus lowering the contribution
rate and cost of labor, can only be a short-term solution. The only long-term
solution can be found after the reform and restructuring of the funds, as well as
after the revision of social rights.
4.3 Analysis of income tax revenues
The analysis of income tax revenues has been made on the basis
of the data provided by the Central Office of Tax Administration of the Ministry
of Finance. Two groups of processed data have been used as the sources of
information about income tax. 
        a) summary information obtained by the annual processing of the
data contained in personal tax files in the tax returns of the
taxpayers, where information on income and taxes and
contributions from salaries and pensions, i.e. from
employment, are shown (statistic processing of the ID form).
This information includes the incomes in all sectors, including
military and police. The information is available for the period
from 1994 to 1997.
        b) summary information contained in the annual income tax
declarations of the taxpayers, where (besides salaries and
pensions) incomes from crafts, self-employment, leases and
rents and foreign incomes are reported. The information is
available for the period from 1994 to 1997. Only a detailed
classification of data obtained by processing the crafts sector and
self-employment has been elaborated. Therefore, it will be
mostly used for further analysis. Detailed information on the
crafts trade and self-employment is available only for 1996 and
1997.
In order to obtain aggregate information on the overall income
and overall taxes paid, the data from the statistic processing of the ID forms and
the data from the processing of annual income tax reports have been summed up,
but only for the crafts trade and self-employment, which are processed separately.
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For this reason, the information on leases and rents and foreign income has been
left out in the analysis. However, since this information makes up only around 2
percent of the overall reported income, we consider that the conclusions obtained
by this analysis can be applied to the overall income and overall taxes. 
It should be noted that in our analysis we could not use only the
data from the processing of annual tax reports, because they contain the income
from salaries and pensions (that is, from employment) only for those taxpayers who
are obliged to submit tax declarations (because they have received other types of
income besides their salaries and pensions) and not for all taxpayers. The data on
all incomes realized through salaries and pensions (both for the taxpayers who have
to submit tax declarations and for those who do not) are obtained from processing
of the ID forms. As mentioned above, the data on the crafts sector and
self-employment are added to them, in order to obtain information on all incomes
and taxes, both for the tax payers who have to submit tax reports and for those who
do not (because they only receive income from their salary or pension). But, since
detailed data on crafts sector and self-employment are available only for 1996 and
1997, our data on the overall income and pertaining taxes refer to these years only.
The data point at a number of interesting facts:
        1) The incomes from salaries and pensions make up a major part
of the overall income, i.e. 92 percent in 1996 and 93 percent in
1997 (see table 10). Consequently, income from the crafts
sector and self-employment account for the remaining 8 percent
and 7 percent, respectively, of the overall income. This is why
the largest portion of taxes is collected from salaries and
pensions: 87 percent and 89 percent, respectively, of the overall
collected taxes in the years of reference. Thus, taxes collected
from the income from the crafts sector and self-employment
account for only 10 to 12 percent of the overall collected taxes.
This indicates that the tax administration should pay increased
attention to the very tax on the income realized through
employment. On the other hand, the prevention of tax evasion
in the crafts sector and self-employment has a certain
pedagogical and media function, rather than financial effects. 
        2) Incomes from salaries and pensions grow continually by high
nominal and real rates, which reflects high growth of the wage
bill in the 1994-1997 period. The taxes collected from such
growing incomes show more volatility. So, while incomes in
specific years grow, the collected taxes drop. On the other hand,
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the incomes from the crafts sector and self-employment
dropped in 1997 by around 8 percent, while the taxes collected
were even 16 percent lower. This can indicate two things:
either economic activity in the crafts sector dropped, or the
taxpayers adapted to the new tax system and found ways of
evading income tax.
        3) The movement of the income and tax from employment, the
crafts sector and self-employment presented here also
determines the tendencies of overall movements. Thus,
although the overall income in 1997 grew by 14 percent, the
overall collected income tax was lower by around 3 percent. 
        4) It is particularly interesting to observe the movement of tax
rates for specific types of taxes. A distinction should be made
among statutory tax rate (the rate determined by law), average
tax rate (the one determined as the share of tax in the tax basis)
and real or effective tax rate (the share of tax in the overall
income, i.e. the pre-tax income that has not yet been transferred
to the tax basis according to the provisions of tax law). Average
and effective tax rates were calculated for salaries and pensions
in the 1994-1997 period; the same tax rates were calculated for
the crafts sector and self-employment for 1996 and 1997;
overall average and effective rates for 1996 and 1997 were
calculated as well (Table 11). A drop of all rates for all types of
income for all periods can be noticed. In 1997 this drop was
particularly noticeable, because as of 1  January of that year thest
bottom marginal tax rate was reduced from 25 to 20 percent
and the basic personal allowance was increased from HRK 700
to HRK 800 per month. This reflected in a drop of the average
tax rate for overall incomes of around 2 percentage points and
in a drop of the effective tax rate for as much as 4 percentage
points. The drop of tax rate on salaries and pensions was the
major contributor to the drop of tax rates on overall incomes,
because this category includes the lowest incomes, i.e. the ones
subject to the 20 percent rate only. 
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Table 10
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Although statutory income tax rates are 35 percent and 20
percent, respectively (25 percent until 1  January 1997), the average tax rate forst
overall incomes was formed on the level of 29 percent and 25 percent for years
1996 and 1997, respectively. This means that it is closer to the lower than to the
upper statutory tax rate. This indicates that lower incomes are predominant in the
distribution of incomes. Average tax rates are higher for the crafts sector and
self-employment than for salaries and pensions. This, in turn, indicates that higher
incomes are predominant in the crafts sector and self-employment, while the lower
ones are predominant in salaries and pensions.
Effective tax rates are of the lowest level, as compared both to
statutory and average tax rates. They show the real burden that a taxpayer carries,
because they are part of the overall realized income that goes for taxes. In Croatia,
14 and 12 percent of the overall income, respectively, was paid for taxes from the
overall incomes in 1996 and 1997. This data are hard to interpret. Only similar
data for other countries could provide a basis for an international comparison of the
tax burden in Croatia. However, some conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the
tax rate movement. Only 11.9 percent of the income realized from salaries and
pensions was spent on taxes in 1997, unlike in 1994, when 17 percent was spent
for the same purpose. Consequently, the real tax burden of salaries and pensions
was reduced by 6 percentage points. The taxes for craftsmen were also lower in
1997 - by 3 percentage points. Effective tax rates for craftsmen are substantially
higher than for those employed in companies, because higher income in the craft
sector also fall in the category to which a higher rate is applied. 
Table 11
AVERAGE AND EFFECTIVE TAX RATES OF INCOME TAX
Employment Total incomeCrafts Sector andSelf-employment
Effective Average Effective Average Effective Average
rates rates rates rates rates rates
1994 17.30 30.45 - - - -
1995 12.87 29.18 - - - -
1996 13.88 29.09 23.22 31.51 14.62 29.37
1997 11.89 25.20 20.65 28.44 12.46 25.43
Note: Effective rates are calculated as a share of taxes and local taxes of the overall income.
Average taxes are calculated as a share of taxes and local taxes in the tax basis (i.e. of the
overall income adapted to tax regulations).
Source: Ministry of Finance, Tax Administration - Central Office.
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5
CONCLUSION 
The distortions that taxes bring into the economy lead to
reduced efficiency and lower income growth. Taxes affect economic growth
through various channels: they affect the amount of savings and investments and
the amount of supply and demand of labor. By reducing the return on human and
physical capital, they distort incentives for capital accumulation and inhibit growth.
Although theory mostly underlines the negative connection
between taxes and growth, empirical research does not provide unambiguous
answers. Numerous channels through which impact of taxes is distributed and the
complexity and interrelation between fiscal and other economic variables make
conducting of empirical research particularly complicated. It has therefore provided
a somewhat disappointing backup to theoretical conclusions. But even without
enough robust empirical results, most of the researchers will agree that growth of
output and employment can be stimulated by tax reforms that encourage neutrality
in taxation. Also by lowering tax rates, extending the tax basis, reducing tax
exemptions and building such a tax structure that can at least distort incentives for
the accumulation of labor and capital to the least possible extent. 
In recent years, the Croatian tax system had the following
characteristics:
        1. Tax reform. The tax system was reformed in two phases: in
1994, when income tax, profit tax and excise  taxes were
introduced and in 1998, when the 1995 Value Added Tax Act
was applied. The goal of the reform was to create a tax system
which is neutral to economic measures. Such a system was
achieved by designing taxes on the consumption principle in the
taxation of income, profit and added value. 
        2. The overall tax burden has been continually growing. The
highest growth of the overall tax burden of the central
government was in 1994, when the share of taxes and social
security contributions in GDP grew by almost 11 points. The
total burden of taxes and social security contributions on the
general government level has been continually growing ever
since: from 43.19 percent in 1994 to 44.40 percent in 1995 and
to 44.72 percent of GDP in 1996.
        3. The overall tax burden is high. Compared to the countries with
similar GDP per capita and with similar transition costs (such
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as Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland), the Croatian tax
burden is still higher by around 3 structural points. But, while
the tax burden in these countries is dropping, in Croatia it is
rising. Compared to the average tax burden in the OECD
countries, the share of taxes in GDP is higher by around 7
structural points. In the case of our main economic partners
(Italy, Austria, Germany), the difference is around 4 structural
points. Particularly disturbing is the high burden of social
security contributions, which is among the highest in the world
and which indicates that the main problem lies in restructuring
of the expenditures of the extra-budgetary funds. The tax
burden (without social security contributions) is even lower
than the average tax burden in the OECD countries.
        4. A high tax burden brings along high tax distortions, the loss of
efficiency in allocation and lagging behind in economic growth.
Lowering of high social security contributions can reduce the
overall tax burden and increase efficiency. Other types of taxes
are mostly adjusted in such way as to cause the least possible
distortions. Reduction of the tax burden can also be achieved by
lowering a relatively high VAT rate. These reductions depend
on the dynamics and extent of the reforms of other parts of the
fiscal system. 
        5. The most important revenues in the structure of overall taxes
are sales tax (with excise taxes) by means of which 17.4 percent
of GDP was distributed in 1997, and social security
contributions, which accounted for 19 percent of GDP collected
in the same year. Profit tax and income tax are relatively
modest revenue of the central government budget revenues.
The taxation structure differs substantially from the one in the
selected countries and groups of countries. Compared to other
countries, the sales tax and social security contributions in
Croatia are relatively more important, while income tax and
profit tax represent relatively a small source of budget revenues.
        6. The largest portion of income taxes is collected on the basis of
salaries and pensions. Namely, incomes from salaries and
pensions make up the major part of the overall gross earnings
of the population (92 percent in 1996 and 93 percent in 1997).
Consequently, the income from the crafts sector and
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self-employment cover the remaining 8 and 7 percent of the
overall income, respectively. This is why the largest portion of
income taxes is collected from salaries and pensions. This
suggests that the tax administration, when collecting taxes,
should pay additional attention to the tax on the income that
is realized by employment in a company. On the other hand,
the prevention of tax evasion in the crafts sector and
self-employment has a certain pedagogical and media function,
rather than financial effects.
        7. The incomes from salaries and pensions grow continually and
at high nominal and real rates. The taxes collected from these
growing incomes show more volatility. Thus, while incomes in
specific years grow, the collected taxes drop. This is a reflection
of the modification of the statutory income tax rates and the
growth of personal allowances.
        8. The average and effective income tax rates from employment
were continually dropping in the period 1994-1997. The
average rate was reduced from 30.5 percent to 25.1 percent and
the effective rate from 17.3 percent to 11.9 percent. The rates
of taxes on income from the crafts sector and self-employment
were also dropping, although these rates were higher than those
of the employment income. This is in conformity with higher
average incomes in the crafts sector and self-employment.
Although the Croatian tax system is mostly based on modern
tax principles, there is still place for some changes (more in the amount of the tax
burden, less in the system itself) estimated as potentially stimulating for economic
growth:
        a) in line with the restructuring of the expenditure side of the
budget, lowering of the VAT rate to 18-20 percent should be
considered;
        b) reducing the number of luxury products subject to
consumption tax is not necessary; also, taxation of negative
externalities (oil derivatives, tobacco and alcohol) by means of
consumption taxes should not be changed, because taxing them
means reducing their consumption. However, revision of
consumption taxes on non-alcoholic beverages should be made;
        c) in line with the restructuring of the expenditure side of
extra-budgetary funds, the social security contributions with the
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share in GDP among the highest in the world should be
reduced;
        d) consider increasing personal allowances  and introducing
additional income tax rate in order to reduce the regressivity of
VAT; preserve the consumption type of income taxes, but
monitor its advantages against comprehensive taxation of
income;
        e) if possible, define the tax basis for profit income as a cash flow.
Thus it would become compatible with the consumption type
of income tax;
        f) reduce the volume of relieves in profit tax and income tax and
not allow introduction of new relieves either for specific
categories of the population, or for specific sectors of the
economy, or specific areas. In respect of allocation, direct
transfers are more efficient than indirect transfers within the tax
system.
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